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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent withdrawal of George W. Bush's nomination of Miguel Estrada 
to the D.C. Circuit, bemoaned by Senate Republicans as the first-ever successful 
filibuster of an appeals court nomination,1 underlines a growing sense that the 
federal judicial appointments process has degenerated, in the words of one 
senator, into a vicious cycle of "payback on top of payback on top of payback."2 
Tempers, to be sure, are fraying.  Republican leaders blame "rank and unbridled 
Democratic partisanship"3 for what they have dubbed a "political hate crime"4 
and a "constitutional disaster,"5 and the White House has taken to bypassing the 
Senate entirely with the use of recess appointments.6  Meanwhile, Democrats 
bitterly accuse Republicans of employing a "double standard"7 – and even 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Adjunct Assistant Professor of Poli tical 
Science, University of California, San Diego.  This material  i s based upon work supported under 
a National  Science Foundation Graduate Research  Fellowship.  Any opinions, findings, 
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the National  Science Foundation.  The author wishes to thank 
Gerhard Casper and David Brady for invaluable comments and cri ticisms. 
1 See Helen Dewar, Polarized Politics, Confirmation Chaos, WASH. POST, May 11, 2003, at A5; CNN, 
Estrada withdraws  as  judicial nominee (Sept. 4, 2003), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/09/04/estrada.withdraws/index.html .  
2 Helen Dewar, Confirmed Frustration With Judicial Nomination Process, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2003, 
at A19 (quoting Democratic Senator Mark Pryor). 
3 Helen Dewar, Estrada Abandons Court Bid, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at A19 (quoting Senate 
Majority Leader Bill  Frist). 
4 Id. at A19 (quoting House  Majori ty Leader Tom Delay). 
5 Helen Dewar, An All-Nighter in the Senate, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Dewar, 
All-Nighter] (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch  on Democratic 
obstruction of judicial  nominees). 
6 See Mike Allen, Bush Again Bypasses Senate to Seat Judge, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, at A1, 
available at h ttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58072-2004Feb20.html 
(describing the recess appointments of embattled circui t court nominees Charles Pickering and 
William Pryor to the Fifth  and Eleventh  Circuits).  
7 Helen Dewar, Battle Over Judges Continues, WASH. POST, July 31, 2003, at A17 (quoting Senator 
Patrick Leahy); see also, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, This Time, It's Personal, AMERICAN PROSPECT, 
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political espionage8 – to achieve their political goals.  Efforts by the Republican 
leadership to generate public outrage over stalled judicial nominations by 
insisting upon all-night debate have even prompted the Senate chaplain to pray 
for civility.9  Both sides recognize that they have settled into a pattern of 
destructive behavior that seems only to be worsening.10  It is often suggested that 
the failure (or near-failure) of one or more Supreme Court nominations between 
the late 1960s and early 1990s – for example, the Bork nomination – is to blame 
for dragging the politics of judicial selection into a vicious cycle of retribution.11   
There are problems with this conventional account.  It is fundamentally 
circular: the bitterness of conflict over judicial nominations cannot be used to 
explain itself.  It also uses a constant to explain a change: Supreme Court 
nominations have failed with some regularity since the early days of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
June 4, 2001, at 13 (quoting exchange between Leahy and NPR reporter Nina Totenberg); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) 
(arguing that Senate Republicans are guilty of " just plain hypocrisy"  in light of their behavior 
during the Clinton administration). 
8 The Senate Judiciary Committee has launched an investigation into the use and dissemination 
by Republ ican aides of Democratic strategy memoranda stored on a shared computer server.  On 
the Republ ican side, Senator Hatch  has called the conduct " unethical ," i f not " criminal"; on the 
Democratic side, Senator Kennedy has likened it to the Watergate scandal.  See Kelley Beaucar 
Vlahos, Former Aide in Memo Leak Seeks Probe of Dems, FOX NEWS, Feb. 12, 2004, at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,111286,00.html  (quoting Senators Hatch  and Kennedy); 
Dahlia Lithwick, Memogate, SLATE, Feb. 19, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2095770.  To make 
matters worse, a  Republ ican aide who was pressured to resign as a consequence of the leaked 
documents has since petitioned the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the Democratic 
members of the Judiciary Committee for ethics violations that he alleges are evidenced by the 
memoranda themselves.  See Vlahos, supra; Li thwick, supra. 
9 See Steve Turnham, Reid blasts Frist in the Senate, CNN (Nov. 10, 2003), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/10/senate.spat/index.html  (quoting Senate 
Chaplain Barry Black's opening prayer).  So far, the prayers do not appear to be working.  See 
Dewar, All-Nighter, supra note 5, at A1 (" The Republicans are like children in the playground. 
They want all  the toys.") (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy, ranking Democrat on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, on the Republican-sponsored all-night debate). 
10 See, e.g., Dewar, supra note 2, at A19 (quoting Republ ican Senators Lindsey Graham and John 
Corny n and Democratic Senator Mark Pryor); Jesse J. Holland, Dems claim votes to block Bush 
nominee, SALON (May 1, 2003), at h ttp://www.salon.com/news/wire/2003/05/01/nominee/ 
index.html  (quoting Senator Cornyn and Democratic Senator Charles Schumer on the need for 
reform of the judicial  appointments process); Dewar, supra note 1, at A5 ("it's gotten into a 
retribution mode" ) (quoting former Senate Judiciary Committee staff member Laura Cohen Bell). 
11 See, e.g., Mark Silverstein & William Haltom, You Can't Always Get What You Want: Reflections on 
the Ginsburg and Breyer Nominations, 12 J. OF LAW & POLITICS 459, 461-62 (1996) (drawing the line 
at 1968, with  the defeat of Johnson's effort to elevate Abe Fortas to Chief Justice); Stephen O. 
Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICKINSON L. 
REV. 247, 326 (1999) (quoting Orrin Hatch  as faulting Democratic handling of the Bork, Souter, 
and Thomas nominations, as well  as Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice); id. at 327 (quoting 
Yale law professor Robert Gordon as drawing the line at the Bork nomination); Joan Biskupic, 
3
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Republic,12 but gridlock and ideological conflict over lower court nominations 
are more novel phenomena.  A search for underlying historical and institutional 
causes may instead be in order.  This paper argues that expansion of the White 
House's role in judicial appointments since the late 1970s, at the expense of the 
Senate, has made a cooperative equilibrium exceptionally difficult to achieve or 
sustain.  It is further suggested that the mere possibility of divided government 
exacerbates the difficulty of achieving cooperation by increasing uncertainty 
about both the benefits of cooperative behavior and the costs of retaliation.   
Part II of this paper describes the federal judicial appointments process 
and attempts to place it in historical, political, and institutional context.  Part III 
introduces relevant game theory concepts and explains how relations among the 
players in the judicial appointments process fall roughly into the same mold of 
strategic interaction as the classic Prisoner's Dilemma.  Part IV suggests that the 
possibility of divided government affects the strategic calculations of senators 
and presidents alike, for the worse.  Part V identifies broader research questions 
suggested, but left unanswered, by the argument posed here.  It also considers  
the shortcomings of various solutions and concludes that current patterns of 
behavior will prove highly resistant to change. 
 
II.  THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS  PROCESS 
 
A. Historical background 
 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the nation's first federal judgeships, 
19 in all: 6 justices of the Supreme Court, and 13 district court judges.13  Today, 
over 850 such judgeships are authorized by statute.14  The Appointments Clause 
provides that the President  
shall  nominate, and by and with  the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other publ ic Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Clinton Avoids Activists in Judicial Selections, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1995, at A1 (quoting poli tical 
scientist Sheldon Goldman on the consequences of the Bork nomination). 
12 See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
13 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, History of Federal Judgeships tbl .k (2003), available at 
http://www. uscourts.gov/history/tablek.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2003). 
14 See id. 
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Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which  shall  be established by law.  
But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such  inferior officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of 
departments.15 
The allocation of nominating authority to the President, on the one hand, and of 
the undefined powers of "advice and consent" to the Senate, on the other, is a 
formula that has yielded its share of political conflict and unfilled judicial 
vacancies.  Nor is Congress as a whole excluded from the process: the 
Appointments Clause confers on Congress the power to determine which offices, 
apart from those enumerated in the text of the clause itself, require Senate 
confirmation.  It is understood that a president cannot simply declare that district 
or circuit judges do not require confirmation; nor has any president attempted to 
do so. 
 In its historical origins, the Appointments Clause, like many provisions of 
the Constitution, reflected a compromise between those such as Madison and 
Hamilton who favored a stronger central government, and others who feared 
executive power: the former wished to vest the appointment power entirely in 
the President, while the latter preferred to entrust it exclusively to the Senate or 
to the entire Congress. As adopted, the compromise proposed by Hamilton 
purported to balance considerations of efficiency, accountability, expertise, and 
quality assurance.  It gave exclusive responsibility for making nominations to the 
President on grounds of efficiency, accountability, and predisposition to consider 
the interests of the nation as a whole, but also accorded the Senate the 
responsibility of checking presidential abuse and lapses of judgment.16   
This division of power is not an even one.  In any conflict with the 
President, the Senate begins with several institutional handicaps.  It is difficult 
for a divided multi-member body – especially one as notorious for the 
independence of its members as the United States Senate - to muster sustained 
opposition to a unitary leader such as the president; problems of coordination 
and coalition-building abound.  The president's ability to appeal directly  to 
voters nationwide, and to mobilize them against recalcitrant politicians, also tips 
                                                 
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, §  2. 
16  See MICHAEL J. GE RHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000). 
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the scales in his favor.17  By design, the Appointments Clause further favors the 
president by granting him the power of nomination, and thus of initiative, while  
casting the Senate in a reactive role.18  The power to nominate includes the power 
to resubmit a nomination repeatedly -- a power that, as Gerhardt observes, "will 
enable him sooner or later to get his way unless the Senate has a sufficiently  
good reason that can persuade or move a majority to put its own political capital 
repeatedly on the line against it."19  Alternatively, a president may simply 
threaten to nominate an even less palatable candidate.20  Thus, at least in the 
context of Supreme Court appointments, it is generally the case that "the role of 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., id. at 305 ("It i s no coincidence that President Clinton's publ ic denouncement of the 
paralysis in judicial  selection at the end of 1997, coupled with  the Chief Justice's criticisms of the 
Senate's slowdown in 1997 and 1998, produced some movement, albeit temporary, in the judicial 
confirmation process."). 
18 As Hamil ton makes clear in Federalist No. 66, an imbalance in favor of the President was not 
only anticipated, but intended: 
It will be the office of the President to nominate, and, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, to appoint.  There will, of course, be no exertion of choice on the part 
of the Senate.  They may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to 
make another; but they cannot themselves choose – they can only rati fy or reject 
the choice of the President.  They might even entertain a preference to some 
other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed, 
because there might be no posi tive ground of opposi tion to him; and they could 
not be sure, i f they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would 
fall  upon their own favouri te, or upon any other person in their estimation more  
meri torious than the one rejected. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 373 (Alexander Hamil ton) (Clinton Rossi ter ed., 1961). 
19 GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 36. 
20 For example, had Clarence Thomas not been confirmed, for example, Bush  could have 
nominated someone even less palatable to liberals like Senator Orrin Hatch, who would have 
benefited from the unwillingness of the Senate to reject one of their own.  Abhorred by many 
liberals, Hatch  has surfaced repeatedly as a Supreme Court candidate when Republ ican 
presidents have been faced with  Supreme Court vacancies.  See Viveca Novak, Off the Bench?, 
TIME, Feb. 26, 2001, at 54; Ted Gest, The ball's in Reagan's court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 
6, 1987 at 20.  Such  threats, however, do not always succeed.  A determined Senate of an 
opposing party may prevail, particularly when the nominees themselves display vulnerabili ties. 
Nixon's nomination of Clement Haynsworth  for the Supreme Court was rejected following 
vigorous opposi tion from labour and civil  rights groups and ethical  questions over his financial 
interests.  Vowing to keep nominating southern conservatives until  one was confirmed, Nixon 
next named  G. Harrold Carswell, who was also rejected.  Carswell's abilities were so suspect that 
" [e]ven Nixon Administration insiders considered him a 'boob' and a 'dummy'" ; nor was his 
nomination helped by film of an early speech  in which  he had endorsed white supremacy.  
JEFFRE Y A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 137 
(1993).  Nixon was forced finally to settle upon Lewis Powell , a  moderate southerner.  See id. at 
135-37.  
Conversely, senators may make successful  threats of their own: for example, having 
concluded that southern senators would block the appointment of blacks or civil  rights lawyers 
to appeals courts in the south, the Kennedy administration simply declined to propose any such  
candidates.  See Donald R. Songer, The Policy Consequences of Senate Involvement in the Selection of 
Judges in the United States Courts of Appeals, 35 WESTERN POLITICAL Q. 107, 109 (1982). 
6
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 24 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art24
DRAFT 7/7/04  12:49 AM 6 
the Senate in Supreme Court nominations has been limited to consent."21   At the 
same time, however, the practices and traditions of the Senate have enabled it to 
play an active and historically dominant role in the appointment of district and 
circuit judges, as will  be discussed below. 
 
B. Presidential practices in the selection of judicial nominees 
  
In selecting judicial nominees, presidents employ a mix of criteria that 
includes objective merit, party loyalty, personal friendship with the president, 
demographic diversity, and what might be termed "agreement with the 
president's basic political and constitutional philosophy" or, more simply, 
ideology.22  For their part, judges themselves tend to attribute their appointment 
to a combination of "political participation, professional competence, personal 
ambition, plus an oft-mentioned pinch of luck."23  Though the relative 
importance of these factors is in no way fixed, ideology can be expected to weigh 
heavily, especially in appointments to more important posts.24  As Segal and 
Spaeth put it: "Given the Supreme Court's role as a national policy maker, it  
would boggle the mind if Presidents did not pay careful attention to the ideology 
and partisanship of potential nominees."25  Presidents have also emphasized 
diversity to varying degrees, both as a goal in itself and as a means of securing 
political support from particular constituencies.  Carter and Clinton, in 
particular, have been noted for their attention to diversity at all levels of the 
federal bench: a record 58% of Clinton's judicial appointees were women or 
minorities, with Carter a distant second at 35%.26  While high-profile  
                                                 
21 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 126. 
22 GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 129; see also SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 130 (noting that 60% 
of Supreme Court appointees have been personally acquainted with the presidents who 
appointed them). 
23 J. WOODFORD HOWARD JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF 
THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 90 (1981). 
24 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 624-26; GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 129-30 (noting Bush  
Sr.'s rate of cross-party district court appointments); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 127.  
25 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 127. 
26 David O'Brien, Judicial Legacies: The Clinton Presidency and the Courts, in THE CLINTON LEGACY 
114 (Colin Campbell  &  Bert A. Rockman eds. 2000); see also GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 130-31; 
Sheldon Goldman, Elliott E. Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton's Judges: Summing up the 
legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228, 242-45 (2001).  The Washington Post reports that the current Bush 
administration is so anxious to identi fy ideologically suitable minority candidates that "after 
7
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appointments might be dismissed as tokenism, the potential electoral rewards 
are obvious and tempting to leaders from both parties.27 
Over time, the White House has adopted organizational strategies by 
which judicial selection at all levels has been fashioned into an instrument of 
policy.  It  is a requirement of any effective presidency, Moe has argued, that 
sensitive political activities – namely, those critical to successful execution of the 
president's policy agenda - be conducted by those loyal to the president.  He 
identifies two successful strategies by which presidents extend and consolidate  
their control over policy: politicization, or the embedding of likeminded political 
appointees ever deeper into the various departments of government; and 
centralization, or the relocation of sensitive functions into the White House itself.28 
With respect to politicization, it is difficult to imagine a set of political 
appointees more irrevocably embedded in government than federal judges with 
life tenure.  Whereas regular political appointees face replacement by subsequent 
presidents, federal judges continue to make or break policy long after the 
presidents who appointed them have lapsed into history.  From wrangling over 
the establishment of a federal banking system29 to obstruction of the New Deal,30 
history has demonstrated how presidents leave judicial legacies that can frustrate 
                                                                                                                                                 
officials have exhausted their personal networks in particular geographic areas, they have 
scoured the directories of federal  and state judges, and even the rosters of major law firms." Mike 
Allen & Helen Dewar, Second Judicial Nominee Targeted, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at A1. 
27 For example, Eisenhower sought for electoral  reasons to appoint a  Catholic to the Court, while 
Reagan boasted of being the fi rst to appoint a  woman.  See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL 
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 116, 329 (1997); Goldman, 
Slotnick, Gryski & Zuk, supra note 26, at 245; GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 130-31. The elder Bush's 
claim that his nomination of Clarence Thomas was based solely on merit, to the exclusion of race, 
met with  contradiction from his own officials.  See John E. Yang & Sharon LaFreniere, Bush Picks 
Thomas for Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at A1.  More recently, during the 2000 
presidential election campaign, both  contenders coveted the opportunity to be the fi rst to appoint 
a  Hispanic to the Supreme Court.  See Alexander Wohl , Contenders for the High Court, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Nov. 20, 2000, at 30, 30. 
28 See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (John 
E. Chubb & Paul  E. Peterson eds. 1985). 
29 See McCulloch  v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-21 (1819) (holding that the federal 
government possessed the consti tutional  authori ty to incorporate the Bank of the United States); 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 52 (2d ed. 1991) (ci ting Andrew Jackson's 1832 veto on constitutional  grounds of an act to 
recharter the Bank of the United States, 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 581-82 (J. 
Richardson ed. 1900), notwithstanding the Court's decision in McCulloch). 
30 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 520-50 (1935) (holding 
unconstitutional  a statute that authorized the executive to fashion and approve a " code of fair 
competition"  for the poultry industry). 
8
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their successors.  Truman went so far as to call the appointment of federal judges 
"the most important thing that I do," though his own choices tended to reflect 
considerations of political patronage rather than policy.31  Nixon, by comparison, 
adopted the ideological screening of judicial candidates on the explicit  
recognition that his judicial appointments would continue to "influence the 
course of national affairs for a quarter of a century,"32 while commentators have 
singled out Reagan for taking the politicization of the judiciary to new heights by 
implementing a centralized high-level process for the ideological vetting of 
judicial candidates.33  There is even evidence to suggest that Reagan made a point 
of selecting younger judges for the purpose of prolonging his judicial legacy.34 
With respect to centralization, developments over the last thirty years 
have strengthened the role of the White House in judicial appointments at the 
expense of other institutions.  Since the Nixon administration, presidential 
experimentation with various institutional arrangements for identifying potential 
judicial nominees has eroded the roles played by the Justice Department and 
individual senators.  Within the executive branch, the movement away from 
historical reliance upon the Justice Department toward centralization in the 
White House has been piecemeal and irregular.  Nixon and Reagan opted for a 
high degree of centralization, while Ford and Carter retained a more substantial 
role for the Justice Department; Clinton, meanwhile, found himself caught 
between approaches for reasons not of his own choosing.35  To the extent that 
                                                 
31 See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 76. 
32 Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Judicial Selection in the New Milllenium: Prologue, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
587, 589-90 (2003) (quoting memo from Tom Charles Huston, which  Nixon endorsed in wri ting); 
GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 205-06 (same). 
33 See id.; see also Michael  J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection As War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 678 
(2003) (remarking upon Reagan's reputation for attending to the ideology of his judicial 
nominees). 
34 See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 336-37, 353. 
35 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 117-118. Within the Justice Department, the selection of judicial 
nominees was historically the responsibility of the deputy attorney general's office.  Under 
Reagan, the task was reassigned to a special  office within the Department,  the aptly named 
Office of Legal  Policy.  See id. at 120.  Reagan further dismantled Carter's nominating 
commissions and instituted in their place a President's Committee on Federal  Judicial  Selection, 
which  drew together high-level  officials and trusted presidential  advisors on a weekly basis.  See 
id. at 120.  The elder Bush  downgraded the Office of Legal Policy (renaming it the Office of Policy 
Development in the process) and moved principal  responsibility into the White House Counsel 's 
office.  Gerhardt reports that " [t]his approach  sometimes created friction with  Justice Department 
personnel , whose background work and verification of nominees'  qualifications were closely 
reviewed to the point of being almost completely redone - and sometimes undone - by White 
9
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centralization entails duplication of Justice Department functions within the 
White House, it also comes at the risk of conflict and inefficiency.36 
Whatever the specific institutional configuration, the goal has been to 
ensure that the politically sensitive task of judicial selection falls to trusted 
presidential advisers.  By the mid-1990s, this circle of participants, spanning the 
White House and Justice Department, numbered sixty or so.37  The demands of 
identifying and evaluating judicial candidates in every part of the country, 
however, outstrips this relatively modest institutional capacity.  Consequently, 
these officials have historically turned to their vast personal networks of "friends, 
acquaintances, and fr iends of friends."38  Unlike their counterparts in a number of 
other countries,39 sitting federal judges are not themselves consulted in any 
systematic way regarding potential appointments: one commentator has 
suggested that such a role, if formalized, could raise separation of powers 
concerns, insofar as it might "require the federal judiciary to perform a clearly 
nonjudicial function."40  Given the judiciary's interest and expertise in the matter, 
however, it is not disturbing that informal consultations do occur.  It can further 
                                                                                                                                                 
House officials.  This duplication cost Bush  precious time in processing potential judicial 
nominations."   Id. at 121.  Under Clinton, greater chaos ensued.  Though his plan was to revive 
Reagan's system by upgrading the Office of Policy Development, Clinton's delays in appointing 
an attorney general  and assistant attorney general tied up his intended mechanism for making 
judicial appointments, and the White House Counsel 's office was forced to take up the slack.  No 
sooner was leadership restored at the Justice Department than it began to struggle with  the White 
House Counsel 's office for control  of the process, as under Bush .  At the same time, the 
Democrats lost control  of the Senate, and to conserve scarce pol itical  capital, the White House  
resorted to leaking the names of potential  nominees to the Senate and to the media as a means of 
gauging potential  opposi tion.  See Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 11, at 471 (discussing the 
choice of Stephen Breyer to replace Harry Blackmun).  The combination of infighting, 
cautiousness, and Senate opposi tion greatly slowed the appointments process.  See GERHARDT, 
supra note 16, at 122; O'Brien, supra note 26, at 113; Silverstein & Haltom, supra, at 474 (noting that 
Clinton took three times as long to nominate Supreme Court justices as any president since 
Nixon). 
36 See supra note 35; see also, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 254-59 (describing confl ict between 
Carter's Justice Department and White House Counsel  over judicial  selection). 
37 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 119 (quoting Judge  Harold Tyler). 
38 Id. (quoting Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States C ourts of Appeals, 1967 
WISC. L. REV. 186); see also Allen & Dewar, supra note 26, at A1 (reporting that officials in the 
current administration have exhausted their personal  networks in the hunt for ideologically 
sui table female and minori ty candidates). 
39 See Department of Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: a new way of appointing judges, at 
Annex B 66-80 (July 2003), available at http://www.lcd.gov.uk /consult/jacommission/index.htm. 
40 GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 232. 
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be expected that presidential advisers selected for the bench may remain in 
contact with those responsible for their appointment.41 
The relative influence of presidents and senators over judicial 
appointments has varied over time.  Historically, senators have enjoyed 
considerable influence over both district and circuit court appointments within 
their respective states.42  By tradition, home-state senators of either party have 
effectively enjoyed a veto over such nominations,43 while senators of the 
president's party have viewed the naming of district judges in particular as 
virtually their birthright.44  Conversely, presidents have tended to exercise 
greater influence over the filling of circuit court vacancies, particularly those 
created by new judgeships, which can be reallocated to a different state if 
negotiations with a particular state's senators stall.45  The net result has been that 
neither presidents nor senators have been able simply to impose their will:  
Robert Kennedy estimated, for example, that his brother's administration 
rejected approximately one in five of the judicial nominees recommended by 
Democratic senators, thereby necessitating often difficult negotiations.46  With 
respect to circuit court appointments, however, the balance of power tilted 
                                                 
41 An obvious example is Justice Fortas, who remained a close adviser to Lyndon Johnson even 
after his appointment.  See id. at 126-27. 
42 Though judicial  circui ts embrace multiple states, specific seats are traditionally identi fied with 
speci fic states to such  an extent that senators are understood to have a stake in how they are 
filled.  See Slotnick, supra note 32, at 590; GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 136-37. 
43 As Deputy Attorney General  in the Johnson administration, Warren Christopher prepared a 
memorandum to h is successor emphasizing the importance of a senator's views: 
"Recommendations of a  Senator of the President's Party from the state where a vacancy exists are 
very important.  Moreover, the views of any Senator, whatever his Party, from the state where 
the vacancy exists cannot be ignored, for Senate tradition gives them a virtual  right of veto." 
GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 10; see also GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 118; Donald R. Songer & 
Martha Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact of Presidential and Home State Influences on Judicial 
Decisionmaking in the United States Courts of Appeals, 55 POL. RES. Q. 299, 312-22 (2002) (finding 
that home state senators of the president's party, but not those of the opposing party, have a 
statistically significant influence upon the ideology of circuit court appointments); infra Part II.D 
(discussing senatorial  courtesy and the blue slip). 
44 See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 79; ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 13 (1997).  
Even minor l imitations upon senatorial  prerogative in the appointment of district judges have 
been rebuffed.  Upon his ini tial  election, Reagan negotiated with  the then-Republican Senate 
leadership to have Republican senators submit a  li st of four or five names for each  vacancy from 
which  the White House might choose.  After a  period of initial  cooperation, Republ ican senators 
began to insist upon a return to earlier practice, under which  a senator would suggest a  single 
candidate who would receive the nomination unless found unqualified.  See id. at 287-90. 
45 See ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 11 
(2001). 
46 See id. at 173. 
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decisively under Carter and has not been restored since.47  Before he had even 
assumed office, Carter sought to fulfill a campaign pledge to base judicial 
appointments on merit, to the exclusion of patronage.48  In his negotiations with 
James Eastland, then chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Carter secured 
Eastland's agreement to the creation in each circuit of a presidentially appointed 
nominating commission that would recommend to Carter the five individuals 
best qualified for a given judgeship.49  These reforms damaged Carter's relations 
with members of his own party in the Senate,50 and his efforts to secure a similar  
system for the selection of district judges were rebuffed by Eastland and a 
number of other senators.51  Meanwhile, within the Carter administration, 
infighting developed between the White House counsel's office and Attorney 
General Griffin Bell over the initially slow pace of affirmative action in judicial 
appointments.  Bell was forced to yield, and the outcome was increased White  
House involvement in the selection process at the expense of the Justice 
Department.52 
The inroads made by Carter upon senatorial prerogative, together with 
the greater role now played by the White House in selecting nominees, paved the 
way for his successor to centralize control over the process and thereby to pursue 
                                                 
47 See Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court 
Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 277 (1997) (" [P]rior to Carter lower court nominations and 
confirmations were more routine.  Norms of senatorial  courtesy in recrui tment and confirmations 
were quite strong and there is some evidence that the Justice Department deferred many lower 
court nomination decisions to senators. ... Attention to lower court nominations became more  
pronounced with insti tutional  changes that centralized judicial  recrui tment under Carter and 
Reagan."); Garland W. Allison, Delay in Senate Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80 
JUDICATURE 8, 9 (1996) ("Beginning with President Jimmy Carter, presidents have taken a more 
active role in selecting candidates for federal  judgeships."). 
48 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 676; GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 238; Sanford Levinson, U.S. 
Judges: The Case for Politics, 226 NATION 228, 228 (1978). 
49 See Slotnick, supra note 32, at 590. 
50 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 676; Slotnick, supra note 32, at 591; Levinson, supra note 48, at 
228 (recounting the open displeasure expressed by Democratic Senator Robert Morgan). 
51 Eastland agreed only to "help the president persuade senators"  to insti tute nominating 
commissions for district judges.  GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 238.  By 1980, senators in 31 states 
had done so in some form.  See id. at 244.  Others, however, proved more resistant.  When Carter 
sent handwritten letters to every Democratic senator urging them to adopt his scheme, Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen is said to have responded: " I am the meri t commission for Texas."  See Slotnick, 
supra note 32, at 590-91.  A subsequent effort by Reagan to assert greater White House control  
over district judge selection met with a similar fate.  See supra note 44(citing GOLDMAN, supra note 
27, at 287-90). 
52 See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 283. 
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ideological considerations to an entirely new level.53  Reagan had Carter to thank 
for taking the politically costly step of wresting power from the Senate; his own 
important contribution was to place that power in the hands of his closest 
advisers.  His goal in doing so was hardly surreptitious.  The Republican 
platform of 1980 openly proclaimed a commitment to the appointment of 
conservatives to the federal bench: 
We pledge ... the appointment of women and men...whose judicial 
philosophy ... is consistent with the belief in the decentralization of 
the federal system and efforts to return decision making power to 
state and local e lected officials. We will work for the appointment 
of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family  
values and the sanctity of innocent human life.54 
To that end, Reagan abolished Carter's regional nominating commissions and 
instituted in their place a single high-level Committee on Federal Judicial 
Selection.55  He further created within the Justice Department an office dedicated 
to the task of judicial selection, the Office of Legal Policy, aptly named to reflect 
the intimate relationship of that task with his policy agenda.56  What Reagan 
carried forward from Carter was not any particular institutional structure or 
even a professed commitment to exclusively merit-based selection, but rather a 
willingness to place senatorial demands second to his own selection criteria.  
Senators bore the burden of dispelling any ideological suspicions raised about 
the candidates they favored.57  By all accounts, Reagan succeeded in making 
ideological considerations paramount: by Goldman's count, over three-quarters 
of his circuit court appointees furthered his conservative agenda, with the 
balance appearing to reward the party faithful.58 
 The tail end of the Reagan years also saw the rejection of Robert Bork's 
nomination to the Supreme Court, an event which has been frequently blamed 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 26; GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 307 (characterizing as 
"inordinate"  Reagan's " emphasis on ideology as an indispensable criterion for appointment" ). 
54 Slotnick, supra note 32, at 592; GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 297.  The 1984 Republican Party 
platform pledged to continue these efforts.  See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 300. 
55 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 120; GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 292. 
56 See id. 
57 See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 305. 
58 See id. at 307. 
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for ushering in the current era of conflict over judicial appointments.59  However, 
as convenient as it may be to trace present-day ideological conflict in the judicial 
appointments process to particular high-profile episodes, Senate rejection of 
Supreme Court nominees was hardly a new phenomenon in 1987, as will be 
discussed below.60  Indeed, statistical analysis suggests that Bork's rejection fits 
historical trends in the confirmation of Supreme Court justices.61  Rather, it is 
conflict over the appointment of circuit and perhaps even district judges that 
appears to have escalated.62  Moreover, this escalation was under way before the 
defeat of the Bork nomination.  If one looks to both the percentage of nominees 
confirmed and the speed with which they are confirmed,63 the level of conflict 
appears to have increased first under Carter, then again sharply in the last years 
of the Reagan presidency, before reaching unprecedented levels in the Clinton 
years following the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress.64  
 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 44, at 19; Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 11, at 461-62; 
Biskupic, supra note 11, at A1 (quoting Sheldon Goldman); Joan Biskupic, Facing Fights on Court 
Nominees, Clinton Yields, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at A1; cf. Kline, supra note 11, at 272-73 
(tracing Republ ican distrust of the ABA back to the failure of the Bork nomination). 
60 See infra Part II.D. 
61 See Peter H. Lemieux & Charles H. Stewart, III, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations 
from Washington to Reagan, Working Papers in Political Science P-90-3, Domestic Studies Program, 
Hoover Insti tution 24-25 (April  1990) (available at Hoover Insti tution Archives, Hoover 
Institution Records, box 550) (employing a multivariate logi t model  to predict Bork's actual 
confirmation vote, and concluding that " [w]hat defeated Bork was partisanship and the 
lengthened process that resulted, but Bork was certainly not the fi rst to fall  victim to these two 
factors."). 
62 District court nominees have tended to face higher confirmation rates and shorter delays than 
circui t court nominees.  From the beginning of the Ford administration through the fi rst six years 
of the Reagan presidency, however, district court nominees were no more likely - and sometimes 
less likely -  to be confirmed than circui t court nominees.  See Allison, supra note 47, at 11 tbl .4; 
Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The Index of  Obstruction & 
Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251, 253-55 & tbls.1-2 (2003); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, The 
Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 259, 268-70 & 269 tbl .1, 
271-73 & 272 tbl .2 (2002).  Inside observers agree that circuit court nominees, not district court 
nominees, are those over which  "the fights always have been, are now, and will  be in the future."  
See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot E. Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk & Sara Schiavoni , W. Bush 
Remaking the Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282, 302 (2003) (quoting C. Boyden 
Grey, White House Counsel  under the fi rst Bush  administration, and citing Brett Kavanaugh, 
Associate White House Counsel  under the current Bush  administration). 
63 These two measures may be combined: Goldman calculates a single "index of obstruction and 
delay"  for each Congress by adding the number of unconfirmed nominees to the number of 
nominees for whom confirmation took longer than 180 days, then dividing that sum by the total 
number of nominees submitted to that Congress.  See Goldman, supra note 62, at 255. 
14
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 24 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art24
DRAFT 7/7/04  12:49 AM 14 
C. The Senate Judiciary Committee and confirmation hearings 
 
While the practices by which the Senate considers judicial nominees have 
evolved considerably over the last century, a constant since 1816 has been the 
central role of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  It is the Committee's 
responsibility to schedule hearings on judicial nominees, to report to the full 
Senate on the nominees, and in particular to vote on whether to recommend 
confirmation. A nominee can in theory be confirmed by the full Senate even if the 
Committee does not recommend confirmation.  If, however, the Committee fails 
to act upon the nomination – if,  for example, it  fails to schedule a hearing or a 
vote upon the nominee - the nomination is never forwarded to the floor of the 
Senate for a confirmation vote and perishes at the end of the congressional 
session (subject, of course, to the possibility of renomination by the president in a 
subsequent session – and then to the possibility of identical treatment the next 
time around).65  While there exists an unbroken tradition of allowing Supreme 
Court nominees to reach the floor for a confirmation vote, the same cannot be 
said of circuit and district court nominees.66 
Through the 1920s, and in stark contrast to the heavily televised Bork and 
Thomas debacles of more recent memory, confirmation hearings were closed 
affairs in which the nominees themselves did not even testify.  Prior to 1929, the 
Senate considered judicial nominations in closed executive session, with the 
notable exceptions of Louis Brandeis in 1916 and Harlan Fiske Stone in 1925.  
Neither nomination was typical for its time: Brandeis, the Supreme Court's first 
Jewish nominee, was plagued by open anti-Semitism, while Stone, the first 
nominee to testify on his own behalf, had earned himself political enemies as 
attorney general by refusing to dismiss indictments against a sitting senator.67  
                                                                                                                                                 
64 See Hartley & Holmes, supra note 62, at 260; cf. Goldman, supra note 62, at 257 (concluding that 
obstruction and delay in the judicial  appointments process "has generally been creeping upward" 
since the beginning of the Reagan administration). 
65 See Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 11, at 474; CNN, Judicial nominees to get new Senate hearing 
(Jan, 24, 2003), at h ttp://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/24/senate.judges.ap/ 
index.html . 
66 See O'Brien, supra note 26, at125-32 (describing appointments " gridlock"  under Clinton); Kline, 
supra note 11, passim (same); Jason Hoppin, Kuhl May  Be Boxed In on Circuit Hopes, THE RECORDER, 
Nov. 6, 2001, at 1 (ci ting Boxer's refusal  to return " blue sl ip"  on Bush  nominee Carolyn Kuhl). 
67 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 67, 69, 199-200. 
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Katzmann has defined four periods in the contemporary history of Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings:  1925-55, "when senators infrequently questioned 
nominees"; 1955-67, the Warren Court era, "when the nominee's appearance 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee became a regular feature of the 
confirmation hearings"68; 1968-87, a transitional period inaugurated by the 
rejection of three Supreme Court nominations in a single year69; and 1987 to the 
present, a period beginning with the rejection of Robert Bork and "in which the 
hearing has become a venue of conflict and consensus."70   
The openness of today's confirmations process is certainly more consistent 
with the idea of democratic government than the practice of closed hearings, but 
for that same reason has proved something of a mixed blessing in practice.  On 
the one hand, it has encouraged electoral accountability, perhaps even at the 
expense of partisan considerations: Southern Democrats who might otherwise 
have opposed Clarence Thomas, for example, nevertheless voted to confirm him 
partly for fear of antagonizing their black constituents.71  On the other hand, 
high-profile confirmation proceedings demand that interest groups participate  
vigorously, not simply to secure the outcomes they favor, but also to establish 
their own political influence.  As Gerhardt has observed: 
[P]ublic hearings have raised the stakes for all concerned in 
confirmation hearings.  Interest groups can use the occasion to gain 
greater attention for their agendas.  The more attention they 
receive, the more they can signal (and perhaps mobilize) their 
membership to put pressure on senators to comply with their 
demands.72   
                                                 
68 The regularization of personal  appearances by judicial  nominees in this period can be 
attributed in particular to the unhappiness of Southern segregationist senators with the Court's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.  See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 66 
(1994). 
69 See Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 11, at 461-62. 
70 KATZMANN, supra note 44, at 19; see also Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 11, at 461-62. 
71 See L. Marvin Overby, Beth M. Henschen, Michael  H. Walsh  & Jul ie Strauss, Courting 
Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 997, 1000-01 (1992) (finding on the basis of logistical regression analysis that senators 
with large African-American consti tuencies who faced reelection were significantly more likely to 
vote to confirm Thomas); Thomas B. Edsall  & E.J. Dionne Jr., Core Democratic Constituencies Split, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1991, at A1. 
72 GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 67; see also KATZMANN, supra note 44, at 34-35. 
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The political character of judicial selection in the U.S. is thus self-reinforcing: by 
freely exposing the appointment of judges to the play of political forces, the 
process increases the extent to which such forces will be brought to bear. 
 
D.   Senatorial courtesy and the blue slip 
 
 In an institution already notorious for the individualism of its members,73 
the rules and practices of the Senate confer upon individual senators a number of 
means to obstruct and frustrate judicial appointments.  Perhaps the best known 
of the senatorial prerogatives is the filibuster, whereby one or more senators 
have the right to engage in "extended debate" that can be halted only by a three-
fifths vote of the full Senate.74  Although new procedural rules mean that a 
filibuster no longer brings unrelated Senate business to a grinding halt,75 it  
remains an extreme measure that antagonizes colleagues.76  Perhaps for these 
reasons, no judicial nomination had (until now) been successfully filibustered in 
over twenty years,77 although there is ultimately little that the Senate leadership 
can do to prevent such attempts.78  Another powerful tool at a senator's disposal 
is the ability to place an indefinite hold upon any number of nominations, for 
any reason of the senator's choosing.  At the extreme, individual senators have 
on occasion placed indefinite holds on all of a president's pending nominees - 
judicial and otherwise - for reasons unrelated to any characteristic of the 
nominees themselves.79 
                                                 
73 In the words of one unnamed " Capitol Hill veteran" : " There are a lot of key senators who don't 
really think they need any leadership[.]  Leadership is not a  problem in the Senate. Followership 
is."  David Von Drehle, The Doctor as Dealmaker? Top Leadership Post Will Test Frist's Image and 
Résumé, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at A1. 
74 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 143; Helen Dewar, Democrats Set to Fight Pickering Nomination, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003 at A7. 
75 See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE 15 (1997). 
76 See id. at 111-15; Silverstein & Haltom, supra note 11, at 467-68 (citing Donald Matthews). 
77 See Thomas L. Jipping, From Least Dangerous Branch to Most Prof ound Legacy: The High Stakes in 
Judicial Selection, 4 TEX. REV. L. &  POL. 365, 455-56 (2000); Helen Dewar, Democrats Split on Plan to 
Block Bush Nominee, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2003, at A5. 
78 See Dan Eggen & Helen Dewar, Ashcroft Opponents Question Veracity, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2001, 
at A10 (quoting then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle). 
79 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 142 (describing the hold placed by Robert Byrd on over 1,000 
Reagan nominees, and a similar hold placed by James Inhofe on all of Clinton's nominees, both in 
retaliation for the president's resort to unannounced recess appointments) 
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Whereas the filibuster and the indefinite hold are the bludgeons in the 
senatorial arsenal, there exist better accepted and more precise means by which 
senators are entitled to block appointments in which they have a particular  
interest.  The best known of these is the multi-faceted notion of senatorial 
courtesy, which refers in part to "the deference the president owes to the 
recommendations of senators from his own political party on the particular  
people whom he should nominate to federal offices in the senators' respective 
states."80  While neither this norm nor the consequences of its violation are 
anywhere specified in writing, presidents who disregard senatorial courtesy risk 
indefinite holds placed under color of right, or outright rejection of their 
nominees, given the reciprocal respect that senators accord each other's 
prerogatives.  In practice, senatorial courtesy tends to be decisive in the case of 
district court appointments, but also influential in the case of circuit court 
appointments.  By tradition, senatorial courtesy is invoked when a senator 
declares a particular nominee to be "personally obnoxious."81 
Senatorial courtesy has been institutionalized by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in the form of the so-called "blue slip" procedure.  For over thirty 
years, there has existed no actual rule authorizing or defining the blue slip 
procedure.  Nevertheless, the Committee has routinely sent slips of blue paper to 
the two senators of a nominee's home state.  The ostensible purpose of the slips is 
to obtain the views of the relevant senators upon the nominee.  Its real 
significance, however, is that failure to return the slip brings the process of 
evaluating the nominee to a halt.  The ultimate effect of the withholding of a blue 
slip has depended upon the practice adopted by the committee chair.  Under 
some chairs, the absence of a blue slip has amounted to "an automatic and 
mechanical one-member veto over nominees"; under others, it has imposed 
merely a substantial obstacle that might be overcome by a decision of the full 
committee..82  There has historically been no requirement, however, that the 
                                                 
80 Id. at 143. 
81 See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 308 (discussing Senator Alan Cranston's decision not to 
invoke the " personally obnoxious"  formula against a  Reagan district court nominee he opposed 
on ideological  grounds). 
82 Through the fi rst half of the Carter administration, it remained the case that the absence of a 
blue slip amounted to "an automatic and mechanical  one-member veto over nominees."  Brannon 
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objecting senator and president be of the same party for the blue slip to be 
effective.83   
The blue slip has in recent years become the subject of heated controversy 
in the Senate.  Historically, its use does not appear to have been very aggressive.  
Slotnick's 1980 survey of senators and their staff found that 88% had never 
disapproved of any candidate via the blue slip procedure, and of the six senators 
who indicated they had ever withheld blue slips, only two had not eventually 
returned them.84  The blue slip appears to have enjoyed a resurgence at the hands 
of Republican senators under Clinton, which Democratic senators are now 
continuing under George W. Bush.85  Through the first half of Clinton's first term, 
with the Democrats still in control of the Senate and thus the Judiciary 
Committee as well, the practice continued to be that either of a nominee's home-
state senators could effectively veto the appointment by declining to return the 
form.  Serious conflict developed after Republicans took control of the Senate in 
                                                                                                                                                 
P. Denning, The  "Blue Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the  Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & 
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 75,  77-78 (2001) (quoting memorandum prepared by Judiciary Committee 
staff for incoming chair Ted Kennedy).  Upon h is assumption of the chairmanship in 1979 from 
the conservative southern Democrat James Eastland, under whom a number of Democratic 
nominations had languished, Ted Kennedy liberalized the procedure and declared that in the 
absence of a  blue slip, a  nomination would be referred to the full  committee to decide upon a 
course of action. See id. at 77-78; GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 12 & n.j.  Within these bounds, the 
effect of the blue slip has continued to wax and wane under subsequent chairmanships.  See 
Goldman, Slotnick, Gryski  &  Zuk, supra note 26, at 238 (describing the practices of chairs Strom 
Thurmond and Joseph Biden); GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 307. 
83 See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 12 & n.j (quoting an internal  memorandum prepared during the 
Johnson administration by Warren Christopher, then Deputy Attorney General , explaining that if 
a  blue slip were marked " objection"  by either home-state senator " regardless of party," "the 
custom is that no hearing will  be scheduled"). 
84 See Elliott E. Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate's Role? Part 1, 64 
JUDICATURE 60, 69 (1980). 
85 See Denning, supra note 82, at 83-88.  A recent example of the blue slip gone awry is that of 
Senator Jesse Helms and his successful  efforts to prevent Clinton from filling any vacancies on 
the Fourth  Circuit.  Intent on appointing the first ever black judge to a court in a heavily black 
region of the country, Clinton nominated a total of four African Americans to the court's three 
vacancies.  While two of the vacancies belonged to Helms's own state of North Carolina, the third 
belonged to Virginia, and Clinton's nominee for this posi tion, Roger Gregory, enjoyed the 
support of both  Republ ican senators from Virginia.  Nevertheless, Helms successf ul ly opposed 
all four nominees and further responded by introducing legislation to reduce the number of 
judgeships on the court.  See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 153; Goldman, Slotnick, Gryski  &  Zuk, 
supra note 26, at 247-48.  In addition, as chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, Helms 
successf ul ly stalled over 400 of Clinton's ambassadorial  and foreign relations nominees.  See 
GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 153.  Under George W. Bush, Democrats have in turn proven capable 
of wielding the blue slip against Republican nominees, as evidenced by Senator Barbara Boxer's 
withholding of a  blue slip for a California nominee who had argued as a government lawyer for 
overturning Roe v. Wade.  See Hoppin, supra note 66, at 1; infra note xx and accompanying text. 
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1994 and Orrin Hatch assumed the chairmanship of the Committee.86  As 
nominations stalled in committee – in some cases for years – angry Democrats 
accused the Republican majority of exploiting the blue slip and indefinite hold in 
unprecedented ways, to the point where a Republican senator could 
anonymously veto nominees from a different state.87 
No sooner had the events of the 2000 election awarded the presidency to 
George W. Bush, however, than Hatch announced that the blue slip rule would 
be changed: henceforth, only the failure of both home-state senators to return 
their blue slips would block a judicial nomination.88  In so doing, Hatch argued 
that he was merely following the practice established by previous Democratic 
chairs who gave considerable weight to negative responses but did not 
necessarily consider them dispositive.89  Hatch himself, however, had rewritten 
the text of the blue slip in 1998 to make explicit that no proceedings on a nominee 
would be scheduled "until both blue slips have been returned by the nominee's 
                                                 
86 The extent to which  Hatch acted as committee chair according to his own wishes, as opposed to 
those of the Republican caucus, i s open to question.  To be sure, Hatch  had previously 
demonstrated himself to be one of the most conservative and ideologically aggressive members 
of the committee.  See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 315-16 (describing Hatch's aggressive 
questioning of Reagan district court nominee Joseph Rodriguez).  Nevertheless, Hatch 
encountered criticism not only from Democrats on his left, but also from conservative elements of 
his own party to his right, and he may have been unable to satisfy either side even had he sought 
to do so.  See Kline, supra note 11, at 295-96 (quoting Senator Leahy, ranking Democrat on the 
Judiciary Committee, on how Hatch  is personally cooperative but constrained by his caucus); id. 
at 258 (quoting Hatch) (" Most on my side have been very good about [confirming judges.]  But 
there are always a few who don't want to give anything to this administration, who want to slow 
the process down, who want to deny the administration the chance to nominate judges." ).  As the 
Washington Post has summed i t up, " despite [his] record, Mr. Hatch was seen as one of the good 
guys -- among the only prominent members of his caucus with  whom the Clinton White House  
could do business at all on the  subject of judges." Mr. Hatch's Revisionism, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 
2001, at B6. 
87 See Goldman, Slotnick, Gryski  & Zuk, supra note 26, at 238-39 (citing the plight of California 
nominees Dol ly Gee and Frederic Woocher). Objected Senator Leahy, the Commitee's ranking 
Democrat: " Anonymous Republ ican Senators are becoming unfair ... we remain in a si tuation 
where I do not even know who is objecting to proceeding to schedule a vote on the nominations, 
let alone why they are objecting."   Id. at 239.  In 1982, the then-Republ ican Senate leadership had 
amended the rules precisely to prevent senators from placing holds on judicial  appointments in 
states other than their own.  See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 320-22 (describing the Republ ican 
leadership's response to a threat by Republ ican South  Dakota Senator Abdnor to prevent 
confirmation of a  candidate from Missouri  to the Eighth  Circuit). 
88 Helen Dewar & Thomas B. Edsall , Democrats Block Justice Picks, WASH. POST, May 4, 2001, at 
A10; Michael  J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Judicial Appointments Process, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1687, 1713-14 (2001) 
89 See Dewar & Edsall, supra note 88, at A10; see also Goldman et al ., supra note 62, at 301 (quoting 
Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh's position that Hatch  is merely following a precedent set 
during Democratic Senator Joseph Biden's chairmanship). 
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home-state senators."90  Infuriated Democrats threatened to filibuster all of Bush's 
nominees.91  Hatch's plan to change the blue slip procedure was aborted four 
months into Bush's presidency when the departure of Jim Jeffords from the 
Republican Party returned the Senate to Democratic control.  Following the 2002 
election, however, the Republicans once again control the Senate and its 
committees, and Hatch appears to be making good on his initial plan, even in the 
face of bitter Democratic opposition.92 
 
E. The political realities of judicial appointment 
 
In an influential 1957 article that continues to shape the research agenda 
for political scientists today,93 Robert Dahl confronted the tension between 
judicial review and democracy with a handful of empirical observations. First, 
notwithstanding the fact that federal judges have life tenure, every president has 
enjoyed an opportunity to remake the federal bench.  Second, presidents have 
generally paid careful attention to the ideology of their judicial nominees, with 
an eye both to their eventual legacies and to what political circumstances enable 
them to secure.  Third, and in direct consequence of the first two facts, the 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Hatch's proposed change was not only unwelcome, but also unexpected: 
When NPR reporter Nina Totenberg  confronted Leahy ... with  Hatch's 
statement, Leahy reportedly swore, informed Totenberg that  " we'll  follow the 
rule the same way Senator Hatch followed it for the last six years,"  and stalked 
off to find his Republican col league.  During two closed-door  meetings that 
followed, the committee's Democrats threatened to filibuster all of Bush's 
nominees i f Hatch denied them bluesl ip privileges.91  By the time the 
Democratic caucus convened  in Pennsylvania for a retreat just a  few days later, 
blue slips had reached the  top of the Democratic agenda.   "Interest runs deep 
among Democratic senators on this issue,"  one Democratic aide notes wryly.   
" The session they had on this issue at the retreat was the only one  that ran  long."  
Confessore, supra note 7, at 13. 
92 See Dewar, supra note 7, at A17 (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy's objection to the Republ ican 
" double standard"); Dee-Ann Durbin, Hatch Pushes for Bush Judicial Nominees, GUARDIAN 
(London), July 21, 2003, at xx (describing the progress of two Michigan circui t court nominees 
over the objections of both  Democratic home-state senators); see also Gerhardt, supra note 33, at 
684-85 (noting that the attempted holds by Michigan's two senators are "in retaliation against the 
Republ icans'  fatal  blocks of two Democratic nominees to the same court"). 
93 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 
6 J. OF PUB. L. 279 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Road 
Taken: Robert A. Dahl's Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 613 passim (2001) (discussing the intellectual  legacy of Dahl's article); 
THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MODERN COURT  68-70 (1989) (same). 
21
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ideological orientation of the federal bench rarely strays for long from that of the 
dominant forces in American politics.  As Dahl observed of the Supreme Court: 
Over the whole history of the court, on the average one new justice 
has been appointed every twenty-two months.  Thus a president 
can expect to appoint about two new justices during one term of 
office; and if this were not enough to tip the balance on a normally 
divided Court, he is almost certain to succeed in two terms.  ...  
Presidents are not famous for appointing justices hostile to their  
own views on public policy nor could they expect to secure 
confirmation of a man whose stance on key questions was 
flagrantly at odds with that of the dominant majority in the Senate.  
...   
Consequently it would be most unrealistic to suppose that the 
Court would, for more than a few years at most, stand against any 
major alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority.94 
Dahl's observations have not only withstood the test of time, but also proved true  
for the federal judiciary as a whole.  Every two-term president in the last century, 
save Clinton, has appointed at least three Supreme Court justices,95 while Carter 
has until now been the only president in history to serve a full term without 
appointing a single justice.96  Three-quarters of the presidents who have served 
since Reconstruction have succeeded in appointing 30% or more of the entire 
federal judiciary,97 a feat aided by the periodic creation of new judgeships.98  The 
                                                 
94 Dahl, supra note 93, at 284-85; see also, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME 
COURT  14 (Sanford Levinson ed., 3d ed. 2000) ("In truth  the Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, 
flatly and for very long resisted a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment."); MARSHALL, 
supra note 93, at 78-79 (suggesting on the basis of quantitative evidence that the Supreme Court is 
" roughly as consistent with  public opinion"  as other governmental  decisionmakers); McNollgast, 
Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1631, 1668 (1995) (concluding on the basis of game-theoretic analysis that " [o]ver the long run, 
judicial  choice of doctrine reflects the preferences expressed in the electoral  arena"). 
95 See Joan Biskupic, Court Followers Tensely Await Justice Stevens's Verdict: To Stay or Go?, WASH. 
POST, June 14, 1998, at A2. 
96 See David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, & the Confirmation Process, 
101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1503-04 (1992).  It may not simply be coincidence that Carter and Clinton, the 
only Democrats to reach  the White House in the last thirty years, were both  deprived of the 
opportunity to make as many Supreme Court appointments as pure chance would have allowed.  
Rather, there is statistically significant evidence that judges time their departure from the bench  
strategically so as to enable presidents of their own party to appoint their successors.  The effect 
of strategic departures has, moreover, favored Republ ican presidents over the last century: nearly 
half of Republican judicial  appointments have been to seats vacated by voluntarily departure, a 
figure fifteen percent higher than that for Democrats.  See Gary Zuk, Gerard S. Gryski &  Deborah 
J. Barrow, Partisan Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, 1869-1992, 21 AM. POLITICS Q. 439, 444-45, 
448-49 (1993). 
97 See DEBORAH J. BARROW, GARY ZUK & GERARD S. GRYSKI, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY & 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 23 (1996). 
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result has been that nearly all presidents leave behind a federal bench on which 
their party's appointees constitute a majority.99  Nor, on the whole, have 
presidents approached judicial appointments as an exercise in bipartisanship: 
historically, over 85% of appellate and Supreme Court nominees have come from 
the president's party.100   
It is another brute fact that the Senate is no rubber stamp of judicial 
nominations,101 particularly not in times of divided government102 or presidential 
weakness.103  While the defeat (or near-defeat) of a Supreme Court nominee may 
be a high-profile event, it is neither novel nor exceptionally rare.  Since George 
Washington's unsuccessful nomination of John Rutledge in 1795, the Senate has 
succeeded in killing nearly one in six Supreme Court nominations, or 27 
nominations in total.104  Nor are Supreme Court nominees the only ones at risk of 
rejection: Clinton alone was forced to withdraw over 60 nominations to the lower 
courts.105  Not surprisingly, party and ideology matter considerably. The Senate 
confirms 90% of Supreme Court nominees when controlled by the president's 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 Gerald Ford is the only president since the mid-1800s not to have filled a single new judgeship.  
See id. at 69-70.  The impact of new judgeships upon the ideological  balance of the bench  is felt 
particularly in times of unified government: Congress is more likely to create new judgeships 
when it i s controlled by the president's party.  See id. at 36 tbl.3.4, 56 tbl .4.1; John M. de Figueiredo 
& Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical & Empirical Analysis of 
Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. &  ECON. 435, 447-60 (1996) (finding on the basis of 
econometric analysis that political alignment of the White House and Congress is a  more 
important determinant of growth in the judiciary than caseload pressure); McNollgast, supra note 
94, at 1656-59 (arguing that, following realigning elections, the elected branches expand the 
judiciary as a means of securing the doctrinal  outcomes they favor). 
99 Grover Cleveland and Richard Nixon are the only presidents since 1869 not to have done so.  
See BARROW, ZUK & GRYSKI, supra note 97, at 23. 
100 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 127 (discussing Supreme Court nominations); Goldman 
et al., supra note xx, at 46, 52 (discussing circui t court nominations). 
101 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 77-92 (1985) (attacking on 
historical  grounds the " myth  of the spineless Senate"); KATZMANN, supra note 44, at 10 (arguing 
that "the existence of golden 'good old days'  free of controversy is exaggerated"). 
102 See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 128 (discussing Ford's appointment of Stevens); 
Biskupic, supra note 11, at A1 (quoting pol itical  scientist Sheldon Goldman on Clinton's 
" unwillingness to " wage a war that [he was] sure to lose" ); Biskupic, supra note 95, at A2; O'Brien, 
supra note 26, at 117-25; Paul  Gigot, How Feinstein Is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J., May 9, 
2001, at A26 (discussing similar problems encountered by George W. Bush). 
103 For example, a  president's approval rating is a better predictor of a senator's confirmation vote 
than the senator's own party affiliation. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 157. Conversely, 
presidents are less likely to win confirmation of their nominees in the last year of their term, 
when it i s unclear whether they will  return to fight another day and are thus "likely to have 
minimal  influence over senators of ei ther party."   Id. at 144. 
104 See GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 163; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 132. 
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party, but only 59% when the president's party is in the minority.106 Even 
individual senators have proven to affect the ideology of judicial appointees 
within their states.107  Ideology appears to interact with a nominee's qualifications 
in determining the likelihood of confirmation: in the case of Supreme Court 
nominees, senators are often prepared to ignore either ideology (in the case of 
highly qualified candidates) or qualifications (in the case of ideologically like-
minded candidates), but not both.108  
When presidents intent upon remaking the judiciary have confronted 
contrary-minded senators capable of obstructing them, the result, not 
surprisingly, has been gridlock. In the first two years of the Carter 
administration,  federal judicial vacancies took an average of 38 days to fill;  by 
the end of the Clinton administration, that figure had increased to 226 days.109  
The existence of divided government certainly does not help: for example, while 
a Republican-controlled Senate confirmed 93% of President Reagan's first-year 
judicial nominees in 1981, a Democratic Senate confirmed just 44% of George W. 
Bush's first-year nominees in 2001.  However, even after one factors in the 
existence of divided government, judicial confirmations are proceeding more 
slowly than ever before.  In George W. Bush's first year in office, during which 
time the Senate passed from Republican to Democratic control, the average time 
to confirmation hit 112 days – a record exceeded only by the 133-day average 
achieved by the Republican Senate at the beginning of Clinton's second term.110   
 
                                                 
106 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 144; Jeffrey A. Segal , Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court 
Justices: Partisan & Institutional Politics, 49 J. OF POLITICS 998, 1007 (1987); see also GERHARDT, supra 
note 16, at 111 (citing ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 97-98 (1971)). 
107 See Songer, supra note 20, at 111-12, 118 (reporting a statistically significant correlation 
between the policy positions of judicial nominees and their home-state senators, at least where 
the senator and the president are of the same party). 
108 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 152. 
109 See Gerhardt, supra note 33, at 679. 
110 See id. 
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III.  THE JUDICIAL APPOINTM ENTS GAME 
 
A. The nature of the problem 
 
To bemoan that the federal judicial appointments process has become 
"politicized" merely obscures what it is, precisely, that we find objectionable 
about the process.  At a semantic level, the term itself - "politicization" - 
illuminates rather little.  The appointment of federal judges is an inherently 
political process – namely, one conducted exclusively by political actors free to 
pursue whatever goals they see fit, and limited only by instrumental and 
electoral considerations.  To object that the appointments process is becoming 
political, is akin to objecting that sin is sinful. 
To be more precise, there are three related but distinct phenomena that 
might be singled out for criticism.  The first is an increasing emphasis upon the 
ideology of judicial candidates, for which some term more specific than 
"politicization" must be coined: for lack of a better word, let us call it  
ideologification.   The second is the actual appointment of ideologically extreme 
judges, which might be called extremism.  The third is gridlock, or the inability to 
appoint judges in a timely and efficient manner.111  Though extremism 
presupposes ideologification, these phenomena need not otherwise coincide.  
Presidents can more easily accomplish extremism absent any threat of gridlock; 
conversely, gridlock may occur precisely because senators are attempting to 
resist extremism.  Ideologification can occur without either extremism or 
gridlock, if ideology is carefully considered for the purpose of selecting only 
moderates.  Nor must all three phenomena be considered equally objectionable.  
It is, arguably, both necessary and appropriate to examine closely the ideological 
leanings of those seeking lifetime appointment to high federal office.112  Even 
                                                 
111 Gridlock is defined differently, and more precisely, in the political science literature as a lack of 
policy change despite the existence of a  legislative majori ty that favors change.  See KEITH 
KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 26 (1997); DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG 
VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK 14-20 (1998) (citing Krehbiel). 
112 See, e.g., Helen Dewar & Amy Goldstein, Appeals Court Choice Rejected, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 
2002, at A1 (quoting Senator Charles Schumer's vow to reject nominees " who threaten to throw 
the courts out of whack with  the country" ); KATZMANN, supra note 44, at 10, 38-39 (" [O]pen and 
serious discussion of the nominee's values, approach to the law and to decisionmaking, and 
declared policy preferences may have the salutary effect of reducing the temptation to do battle 
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those who insist that judges ought to be appointed primarily or exclusively on 
the basis of merit – a problematic criterion in its own right113 - might consider 
ideology a more relevant or less objectionable basis on which to select judges 
than patronage, personal friendship with a president or senator, or longstanding 
service to a particular party.   
By comparison, gridlock and its consequences seem incontestably 
undesirable.  As the judiciary itself has long complained,114 unfilled judicial 
vacancies translate into increasing case backlogs115 and impair the judicial system 
in fundamental ways.  Existing judges shoulder greater burdens, individual 
litigants face the hardships of delay, and the quality of adjudication, and even of 
federal law, may suffer.  It is not suggested that the speed with which judges are 
appointed does or even should trump other considerations; assuming ideological 
preferences of even moderate strength, one could reasonably prefer a judicial 
vacancy crisis to a full bench consisting entirely of judges whose understanding 
of the nation's constitutional, moral, and political values is wholly anathema to 
                                                                                                                                                 
in highly personal  terms."); id. at 30 (quoting Senator Arlen Specter); TRIBE, supra note 101, at 93-
110; Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 628 (making the Dahl-esque argument that "ideology should 
be considered because the judicial  selection process is the key majoritarian check on an anti-
majori tarian institution"); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, David A. Schkade & Lisa M. Ellman, Ideological 
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (forthcoming 2003) (arguing for  
" reasonable [ideological ] diversity"  on bench).  But see, e.g., CARTER, supra note 68, at 187-88 (" [I]t 
i s at least a little peculiar that we are told that scrutiny of ' judicial philosophy' is crucial to 
provide a democratic check ... but at the same time, that the Court should not be responsive to 
poli tical  pressure or  publ ic protest."). 
113 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 101, at xi (attacking the " myth that it would be possible and desirable 
to choose Justices solely in terms of the intellectual  acumen with  which  they can 'decode'  the 
mysteries of the Constitution's language and history, without reference to their own bel iefs about 
society"). In actual  experience, those who purport to assess the objective quali fications of judicial 
nominees risk having their own impartiality called into question.  See, e.g., Laura E. Li ttle, The 
ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 37, 37-44 (2001) (detailing the current Bush  administration's 
elimination of the ABA's prescreening role); Kline, supra note 11, at 272-73 (quoting Ed Meese, 
attorney general under Reagan, on Republ ican distrust of the ABA following its mixed evaluation 
of Robert Bork). 
114 See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, 2002 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2003), 
available at h ttp://www.supremecourt us.gov /publicinfo/year-end/2002year-endreport.html 
(including unfilled judicial  vacancies among the "issues that seem regularly to crop up, or perhaps ...  
never go away"). 
115 See DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 15 tbl .1.2, 16 fig.1.2 (2000). 
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one's own.116  Nevertheless, it should be of some value to those on both the left 
and the right that judicial vacancies be filled in a timely manner by objectively 
qualified candidates.  As de Figueiredo & Tiller observe, political actors pursue 
both political and institutional goals when staffing the judiciary: their political 
goal is to foster a judiciary that reaches politically desirable outcomes, but their 
institutional goal is to foster a judiciary that "decides cases fair ly in a cost 
efficient and timely manner, irrespective of politics."117  The existence of 
institutional goals should lead political actors to prefer the appointment of 
moderate judges over gridlock.  From the perspective of either the left or the 
right, the addition of moderate appointees furthers institutional goals without 
worsening the ideological balance of the bench.  
How might participants in the appointments process balance these 
political and institutional goals?  The tradeoffs they face can be expressed in 
terms of the gains and losses to be had from cooperative and noncooperative 
behavior.  Cooperative behavior furthers shared institutional goals, while  
noncooperative behavior furthers contested political goals.  On the one hand, 
there are gains to be had by both sides from cooperative behavior.  On the other 
hand, these gains from cooperation may be outweighed by the gains to be had 
from noncooperative behavior, or defection.  Thus, if a liberal senator considers it  
somewhat beneficial that judicial vacancies in her state be filled, but highly  
detrimental that they be filled with conservative judges, she will choose not to 
cooperate with the appointment of conservative judges.  If a conservative 
president simultaneously happens to place a higher premium upon the 
appointment of like-minded judges than upon the mere filling of vacancies, 
neither player may choose to cooperate.  Yet the outcome for both sides – 
gridlock - will be worse than if they had chosen to cooperate.  While each side 
would prefer above all to have a full bench consisting of ideologically like-
minded judges, both sides nevertheless benefit more from the appointment of 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Tiller, supra note 98, at 444 ("We assume that each  actor prefers judges 
from i ts own party over no new judges and no new judges over judges of an opposing poli tical 
party."). 
117 See id. at 438-39, 456-60 (finding on the basis of statistical  analysis that congressional 
expansions of the judiciary have been motivated by both  political  and insti tutional  goals). 
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moderate judges than from the appointment of no judges at all.118  The crucial 
question is, if each would benefit more in the long run from mutual cooperation 
than from mutual defection, why does cooperation not occur? 
 
B. The challenge of cooperation 
 
 The judicial appointments process, described in this deliberately 
simplified way, poses the same important question as the classic Prisoner's 
Dilemma.119  Both can be described as games of strategy, in the sense that each 
player decides how to act based upon how it expects the other player to act, and 
what gains and losses it attaches to each of the possible outcomes.  That is, each 
player chooses a strategy based upon its beliefs about the world and the payoffs 
it faces.  The Prisoner's Dilemma poses the following set of payoffs: 
 
  Player 2 
  cooperate (C) defect (D) 
cooperate (c) (5, 5) (-10, 10) Player 1 
defect (d) (10, -10) (-5, -5) 
 
For any given combination of strategies, the first number in the parentheses 
denotes the payoff to player 1, the second the payoff to player 2.  Each player 
perceives (correctly) that the other faces a strong temptation to defect.  Defection 
is player 1's best reply120 to either cooperation or defection by player 2: if player 2 
cooperates, player 1 receives a windfall of 10, whereas if player 2 defects, player 
suffers a loss of only –5, as opposed to a loss of –10 had player 1 cooperated.  The 
same is true for player 2.  In the Prisoner's Dilemma, defection is what game 
theorists call a dominant strategy: the alternative, cooperation, is never better 
                                                 
118 More speci fically, it i s assumed that each  player would prefer, in descending order, (1) an 
ideologically like-minded and fully staffed bench , (2) a  moderate, fully staffed bench , (3) a  like-
minded but understaffed bench , (4) an understaffed but contrary-minded bench , and finally, least 
of all , (4) an ideologically contrary-minded but f ully staffed bench . 
119 See, e.g., JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 78-79, 262-68 (1994); 
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION ch . 2 (1982). 
120 A best reply i s simply " the strategy that gives the fi rst player its highest payoff against the 
particular strategy of the other player."   MORROW, supra note 119, at 75. 
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and potentially worse.  Rational players will therefore choose to defect.  The 
resulting payoffs of (-5, -5) are worse than the (5, 5) they would obtain if they 
were both to cooperate.  For better or for worse, however, defection by both 
players constitutes an equilibrium: their behavior is stable because neither player 
can hope to do better by behaving differently, given what it believes the other 
player will do.121  
In the language of game theory, both the Prisoner's Dilemma and judicial 
appointments are noncooperative, non-zero-sum games.  Non-zero-sum simply 
means that there are combinations of strategies available that make  both players 
better off: in this case, cooperation benefits both players at the expense of neither.  
Noncooperative is a term of art and refers not to the behavior of the players, but to 
the fact that they are unable to coordinate their behavior in advance through 
binding agreements.122  There is no court or other third party available  to enforce 
a promise by a player to behave (or refrain from behaving) a certain way.  Most 
real-world games of strategy – including interactions among political actors123 - 
are, in this sense, noncooperative; to assume otherwise is to assume away the 
crucial questions of how, when, and why cooperation occurs.124  In such games, if 
a promise to cooperate is to be enforced, the players must enforce it themselves. 
It is a redeeming feature of real-world games, however, that they tend to 
be played more than once.  By creating the possibility of retaliation, repeat play 
offers the players a way to enforce particular behaviors.125  Under the right 
conditions,126 players can plausibly threaten retaliation that is costly enough to 
                                                 
121 See id. at 8.  In particular, defection by both  players constitutes a common, well-known form of 
equi librium called a Nash equilibrium, in which  each player's choice of strategy is the best reply to 
the strategy i t expects the other player to choose.  See id. at 93. 
122 See id. at 76. 
123 See THRÁINN EGGERTSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & INSTITUTIONS 71-72 (1990) ("In exchanges 
between pol iticians, transaction costs tend to be h igh  ... because there is no powerful  third party 
that helps to enforce contracts in these areas, unl ike the situation in the marketplace.  Therefore, 
self-enforcement of contracts is relatively important in political  exchanges.") (ci ting Kenneth  A. 
Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium & Equilibrium Institutions, Working Paper No. 82, Center for the 
Study of American Business, Washington University at St. Louis (1983)). 
124 See MORROW, supra note 119, at 76. 
125 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12-
13, 56-57 (1990). 
126 To simplify, " wealth-maximizing individuals will usually find it worthwhile to cooperate with 
other players when the play is repeated, when they possess complete information about the other 
players' past performances, and when there are small numbers of players."  Id. at 12; see also id. at 
56-57.  To be more precise, cooperation requires, in addition to the fact of repeat play, that the 
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discourage even the most selfish and calculating opponents from defecting.  
Threats are more effective, in particular, when made between players who are 
expected to be around indefinitely.  In the real world, for example, politicians 
know that they will not be in office forever, and it is often possible to know when 
they are likely to depart.  The knowledge that one will soon be leaving office 
undermines the efficacy of retaliation by rendering future losses moot. 
 
C. The folkways of the Senate 
 
 In the game of judicial appointments, as in politics generally, no one gets 
to play forever.  On the whole, however, senators get to play a lot longer than 
presidents do, and this fact constitutes reason to expect more cooperative 
behavior among fellow senators than between presidents and senators.  At any given 
time over the last thirty years, between one-quarter and one-half of those in the 
Senate had already served longer than twelve years, while approximately one-
fifth had more than eighteen years of service behind them.127  By comparison, 
only one-fifth of presidents – including, in recent times, just two of George W. 
Bush's eight immediate predecessors – have managed to serve a full eight years 
in office,128 while another fifth have served less than one term.129   
The Senate's relative continuity of membership over time has helped to 
foster what Donald Matthews famously described as the "folkways" of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
players do not discount future payoffs, see MORROW, supra note 119, at 267; that there is no 
foreseeable end to the game (else backwards induction leads to defection at the very outset, see id. 
at 279-80); and that retaliation does not inflict on the retaliator losses so steep as to make the 
threat noncredible, see id. at 273-77.  In the alternative, threats can be effective even in finite games 
as long as the players do not k now each  others'  payoffs.  See id. at 280-81, 290-91.   
In the political  context, not all  of these assumptions are realistic, particularly the 
assumption of indefinite play.  If senators were game theorists, a  process of backwards induction 
should lead them, from the fact of political  mortality, to defect in the fi rst round.  See MORROW, 
supra note 119, at 156-58, 279-81 (discussing how backwards induction leads players to defect at 
the very outset of a  game if they know that the game will  end).  Nevertheless, i t i s reasonable to 
think, for example, that legislators prefer to cut deals with  colleagues in good physical  and 
poli tical  health , as opposed to those whose departure seems imminent.  This sort of judgment 
may commonly be called " trust"  but combines knowledge of a  person's reputation with  an 
element of strategic calculation. 
127NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN & MICHAEL J. MILBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 
2001-2002 (2002).  Incumbency rates, though lower than those in the House of Representatives, 
tell  a  similar story: over the last fi fty years, with  the exception of the 1980 election, between 60% 
and 97% of senators seeking reelection have been returned to office.  Id. at 70. 
128 See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 22 (1997). 
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Senate.130  Matthews' seminal 1960 study of the Senate depicted a collegial 
institution characterized by, inter alia, strong norms of courtesy and reciprocity 
that enable competitors to cooperate.131  On his account, the norm of reciprocity 
explains how the Senate manages to conduct its business despite the array of 
individual prerogatives and procedural powers that enable any given senator to 
disrupt that business: 
The spirit of reciprocity results in much, if not most, of the senators' 
actual power not being exercised.  If a senator does push his formal 
powers to the limit, he has broken the implicit bargain and can 
expect, not cooperation from his colleagues, but only retaliation in 
kind.  "A man in the Senate," one senator says, "has just as much 
power as he has the sense to use.  For this very reason he has to be 
careful to use it properly or else he will incur the wrath of his 
colleagues."132 
It is Matthews' enduring insight that reciprocity characterizes the operation of 
the Senate.  The suggestion that a norm of reciprocity causes cooperation, 
however, risks circularity, for cooperation is itself a form of reciprocity.  What 
Matthews calls "the spirit of reciprocity" might be better described, in game-
theoretic terms, as a widely shared tit-for-tat strategy: senators cooperate with 
those who cooperate, and retaliate against those who do not.  The threat of 
retaliation is effective at sustaining cooperation, in turn, because senators are, by 
and large, repeat players. 
 It can be objected that the courtly folkways of the Senate have deteriorated 
since Matthews first described them.133  One might respond that senatorial 
cooperation remains more viable with respect to judicial appointments than in 
other contexts.  Harsher economic times and the resulting heightened political 
competition for scarce resources since the 1960s have played a critical role in the 
emergence of today's "pit-bull politics."134  This logic of shrinking-pie conflict 
does not apply to federal judgeships, the number of which has increased tenfold 
in the last century and, indeed, has doubled every thirty years since 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 See id. 
130 See DONALD R. MATTHEWS, The Folkways of the Senate, in U.S. SENATORS &  THEIR WORLD 92 
(1960). 
131 See id. at 97-101. 
132 Id. at 100-01. 
133 See ERIC M. USLANER, THE DECLINE OF COMITY IN CONGRESS 5-22 (1993). 
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Reconstruction.135  Nevertheless, as detailed in Part II,  there is ample evidence  to 
suggest that conflict in the Senate over judicial nominations has increased at the 
same time as overall levels of comity in Congress have declined.136  How, then, 
can it be said that repeat play has sustained cooperation, in light of this 
increasingly unhappy history? 
 
D. The consequences of greater presidential involvement 
 
The answer lies in distinguishing between what would happen if senators 
were left largely to their own devices to select judges, and what happens when 
presidents assume an increasing role.  There are reasons to think that today's 
levels of ideological conflict and gridlock have more to do with presidential 
efforts to push ideologically unpalatable nominees past unwilling senators, than 
with any inability of repeat play to sustain cooperation among fellow senators.  
Where the Senate is by tradition courtly and collegial, presidents are 
transformative and disruptive.  The White House is occupied by individuals of 
high ambition with the desire to make a lasting mark upon the nation, but little 
time in which to do it.  Effective presidents are thus, by definition and by 
necessity, masters of political disruption.137 The presidency, writes Skowronek, 
"is a battering ram, and the presidents who have succeeded most magnificently 
in political leadership are those who have been best situated to use it forthrightly 
as such."138  This description brilliantly captures, for example, how Reagan 
approached judicial appointments: having campaigned against liberal judges, he 
could claim a mandate to remake the federal bench in his own ideological image 
and in fact did so.  To shift the balance of power over lower court appointments 
                                                                                                                                                 
134 Id. at 7-8, 16-17. 
135 See Russel l  R. Wheeler &  Cynthia Harrison, Creating the Federal Judicial System (1994), Federal 
Judicial  Center, available at http://www.fjc.gov /newweb/jnetweb.nsf /hisc; BARROW, ZUK & 
GRYSKI, supra note 97, at 3. 
136 See, e.g., Goldman, Slotnick, Gryski  & Zuk, supra note 26, at 239 (describing Senator Leahy's 
objection to the placing of holds on judicial  nominees by anonymous Republican senators from 
other states); Dewar, supra note 2, at A19 (quoting Republ ican Senator John Cornyn) (" I'm very 
concerned not only about the broken judicial confirmation process but also how badly it seems to 
have poisoned relations in the Senate ... and hurt our ability to do other things as well."); Dewar, 
supra note 1, at A5 (" [T]he invective and partisanship have grown unusually intense in recent 
months"). 
137 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 128, at 19-20, 27-28 (emphasis in original). 
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from the Senate to the White House is to take the matter away from an 
essentially cooperative institution, and to place it  into the hands of an essentially  
disruptive institution.  
Presidents possess stronger incentives to emphasize ideology in judicial 
appointments than senators do.  The lessons of history are, again, too clear for 
those in the White House not to grasp the impact of judicial selection upon their 
policy agenda.139  The involvement of federal judges in sensitive policy areas 
makes it prudent, if not critical, to heed the ideology of those being appointed.  
Moreover, unlike senators, presidents can be expected to take a greater and more 
systematic interest than senators in the ideological balance of the bench as a 
whole.  The ideological composition of the federal judiciary is, by its very nature, 
a national issue with a national constituency that senators are ill-positioned to 
exploit.  Thus, Nixon and Reagan campaigned on the issue; individual senators 
generally do not.  Once in office, presidents are then rewarded for their 
continuing attention to the issue: ideological appointments are an inexpensive 
way for presidents to mollify the ideologically motivated voters and elites who 
constitute their political base.140   
By contrast, it is largely implausible for individual senators to have a 
noticeable impact on the ideological balance of the bench, much less to claim 
electoral credit for doing so.141  Indeed, the mere attempt may prove costly: a 
senator who seeks to use her powers to affect judicial vacancies in other states 
must contend with the fact that her ninety-nine colleagues enjoy comparable 
powers of retaliation - to say nothing of presidential retaliation.  Overall,  
                                                                                                                                                 
138 Id. at 27-28. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes xx-xx (discussing the judicial  legacies that presidents leave). 
140 As one Republ ican insider observed of the last election: " Everyone on the right agreed in 2000 
that judicial  nominations were the single most important reason to be for B ush ."   Mike Allen & 
Charles Lane, President Renominates Miss. Judge, 29 Others, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2003, at A1 
(quoting Cl int Bolick, former Justice Department official  under Reagan); see also, e.g., Ronald M. 
Peters, Jr., Judicial Nomination Wars, EXTENSIONS, Spring 2004, at 2, 2-3 (observing that the 
increasing ideological  divergence of the Republ ican and Democratic parties rewards behavior 
that appeals to " base voters,"  such  as conflict over judicial  nominees); President bypasses Senate, 
seats disputed Judge, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001862365_pryor21.html  (quoting 
poli tical scientists Larry Sabato and Elliot Slotnick on the possible electoral  motivations behind 
William Pryor's recess appointment to the Eleventh  Circuit). 
141 See Lemieux & Stewart, supra note 61, at 2-3 (suggesting that senators have li ttle to gain 
electorally even from fighting Supreme Court nominations). 
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individual senators may find it more profitable to dispense judicial appointments 
as patronage, than to fight for small pieces of ideological turf in an ongoing 
struggle that is largely beyond their control.  For senators to further greater goals 
with respect to the overall bench requires collective action, which does not occur 
spontaneously.  Coordination can be accomplished through the medium of 
party, but not without ongoing and perhaps prohibitive expenditure of effort.142  
To fight effectively for ideological control of the bench poses a strenuous test of 
party organization and discipline: each side faces not just one bill to be passed or 
one vote to be won, but ongoing warfare over a continual stream of nominations, 
the effects of which are cumulative.  
Greater presidential involvement thus appears likely to bring ideological 
considerations to the fore of the judicial selections process.  For this reason alone, 
one might expect an appointments game between presidents and senators to be 
characterized less by compromise, and more by conflict, than a game played 
largely among senators.  There are more compelling reasons, however, why 
dealings between presidents and senators may not proceed as smoothly as 
dealings among fellow senators.  First, the relative brevity of presidential tenure 
means that presidents and senators alike will be less disciplined by the threat of 
retaliation over repeat play.  The fact that judicial confirmation rates drop in 
presidential election years143 is strong evidence that senators behave less 
cooperatively when faced with an opponent whose days are numbered.  Second, 
in politics as in nature, the strong need not cooperate with the weak.  Between 
senators – that is, among equals – brute force is unlikely to prevail.  By 
comparison, both the characteristics of the respective institutions and the 
                                                 
142 The show of force mustered by both  parties during the recent all-night Senate debate over a 
small  number of Bush  nominees is an example of how senators can pander to their political base 
on the issue of judicial  appointments, but also demonstrates that the effort required may be 
extraordinary.  See Waiting for Godot, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 2003, at 39 ("Filibustering allows 
Democratic senators to prove to their rank-and-file that they are capable of standing up to the 
hated Bush  White House.  The talkathon shows Republican senators are willing to fight for 
conservative nominees." ). 
143 See Allison, supra note 47, at 10-11 & 11 tbl.4 (finding that " confirmation rate declines year by 
year into the president's term" ); Goldman, supra note 33, at 257 (documenting how obstruction 
and delay in the judicial  appointments process rise in presidential  election years, and suggesting 
that "the problem may be an institutional one"  rather than the fault of a  particular party); SEGAL & 
SPAETH, supra note 20, at 144 (observing that Supreme Court nominations are likelier to fail  in the 
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constitutional division of power over appointments confer a variety of 
advantages upon the White House over the Senate.144  These advantages may 
lead presidents to believe - rightly or wrongly - that they will get their way in a 
showdown with the Senate, provided that they are willing and able  to commit 
the necessary political resources.   
Indeed, presidents may even select extreme nominees whom they do not 
necessarily expect to prevail.  It is politically costly for senators to resist judicial 
nominations, and certain nominees may be especially costly to resist.145  
Examples include the elder Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas, well 
calculated to divide Democrats from their black supporters146; the Estrada 
nomination, the failure of which has enabled the younger Bush to attack Senate 
Democrats for being both anti-Hispanic and "obstructionist"147; and, most 
recently, the nomination of the outspokenly conservative black jurist Janice 
Rogers Brown.148  By nominating candidates from the demographic core of the 
opposing party, presidents stand to gain regardless of the outcome: opposing 
senators are forced either to incur political damage,149 or to support nominees 
they might otherwise reject on ideological grounds.150  Senators, by contrast, 
would presumably be less likely to choose unpalatable nominees for the purpose 
                                                                                                                                                 
last year of a  presidential  term, when the president is "likely to have minimal  influence over 
senators of ei ther party"). 
144 See supra Part II.A. 
145 To follow the example set by Bailey & Chang, the costs of resistance might be modeled as a 
function of presidential approval , the race, religion, and gender of the nominee, and the 
nominee's perceived quali fications.  See Michael  Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Extremists on the Court: 
The Inter-Institutional Politics of Supreme Court Appointments 21-23 (paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Poli tical  Science Association, Philadelphia, August 2003). 
146 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (ci ting Overby et al. and Edsall  &  Dionne). 
147 Helen Dewar, Democrats Split on Plan to Block Bush Nominee: Senators Weigh Risks of Filibuster, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2003, at A5; Dewar, supra note 3, at A1 (reporting that Senate Republ icans 
have described Democratic opposi tion as an insult to Hispanics and have vowed to make 
Democrats suffer at the polls); see also Sheldon Goldman, The Senate and Judicial Nominations, 
EXTENSIONS, Spring 2004, at 4, 6 (observing that selection of a  Hispanic nominee for the Supreme 
Court will pressure senators from states with large Hispanic populations to vote in favor of 
confirmation). 
148 See Fueling the Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2003, at A22 (describing Brown as a nominee Bush  
" cannot reasonably expect Democratic senators to support" ). 
149 Republ ican officials report that the current White House has adopted a conscious strategy of 
nominating right-leaning women, blacks, and Hispanics partly in the hope of damaging Senate 
Democrats who oppose  them.  See Allen & Dewar, supra note 26, at A1. 
150 See Bailey & Chang, supra note 145, at 6-17, 29-31 (concluding that the political  costs to senators 
of rejecting certain types of nominees enable presidents to select more extreme nominees).   
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of damaging or embarrassing their colleagues, if only because such behavior 
clearly begs retaliation over the course of repeat play. 
In sum, presidents are likely to be more sensitive to ideology and less 
inclined to cooperate than senators when it comes to appointing judges.  
Gridlock is the result when senators do not simply surrender ideological ground 
but instead insist that presidents either logroll or moderate their choices.  For 
senators, logrolling goes unremarked as collegiality or business as usual.151  Such 
behavior does not, however, characterize the presidency.  Thus, the greater the 
role that the White House assumes in judicial selection, the more difficult it will 
become to reach or sustain a cooperative equilibrium.  The implications of this 
argument should not be overstated: a lack of cooperation between presidents and 
senators does not imply that all nominees will become mired in conflict.  There 
are various reasons why many – indeed, most – nominees will encounter little 
resistance.152  Nevertheless, all other things being equal, presidential 
displacement of senatorial involvement in the appointment of lower court judges 
should entail the more frequent selection of nominees who attract a heightened 
level of conflict. 
 
                                                 
151 See MATTHEWS, supra note 130, at 99-101. 
152 Reasons that are compatible with  the argument presented here include the following.  First, it 
i s costly for senators to resist judicial  nominations, not least of all  because presidents can bring 
poli tical  pressure to bear.  Indeed, presidents may deliberately select candidates who are 
especially costly to resist, as suggested by the plight of Senate Democrats faced with conservative 
female and minori ty nominees.  See supra notes xx-xx and accompanying text (discussing the 
Thomas, Estrada, and Brown nominations).  Having taken into account these costs, senators may 
acquiesce in the appointment of nominees whom they would otherwise oppose on ideological 
grounds.  See Bailey & Chang, supra note 145, at 8, 10, 14-17.  Second, within limits, political  actors 
may tolerate and perhaps even prefer a mix of judges.  If presidents and senators alike wish  to 
appoint a  range of judges, any overlap in their ideal  ranges will  result in the selection of 
consensus candidates, notwithstanding the absence of any intent to cooperate.  Third, the supply 
of ideologically sui table judicial  candidates is finite, if not also discontinuous.  Presidents who 
wish  to fill  the bench  with  nominees of a  highly speci fic ideological timbre may discover that the 
available supply is inadequate to the task, especially to the extent that characteristics other than 
ideology are valued as well.  See supra note xx (citing Al len & Dewar on the limited numbers of 
right-leaning female and minori ty judicial  candidates).  Finally, uncertainty as to the ideological 
stance of nominees aids confirmation, insofar as the appointments process favors the resolution 
of such  doubts in favor of the nominee.  The deliberate fostering of such  uncertainty is reflected 
both  in the withholding of information about nominees, and the selection of so-called " stealth 
nominees"  whose records contain little overt indication of their ideological  stance, though the 
experience of the Estrada nomination suggests that nei ther tactic guarantees success.  See Helen 
Dewar, Senate Panel Approves Estrada's Nomination, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at A4 (describing 
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IV.  THE ST RAT EGIC CONS EQUENCES OF DIVIDED GOVERNM ENT 
 
A. Divided government, filibusters, and gridlock 
 
 By now, we should be prepared to reject two possible explanations of 
appointments gridlock.  The first is the widely expressed view that gridlock is 
the result of politicians engaging in "payback on top of payback on top of 
payback."  Properly understood, retaliation does not prevent cooperation; rather, 
it is the threat of retaliation that sustains cooperative behavior.  The second is that 
gridlock occurs merely because parties disagree over what kind of judges they 
wish to see appointed.  Gridlock does not occur simply because more than one 
ideological viewpoint is represented at any given time in political 
decisionmaking.  If ideological disagreement alone were enough to cause 
gridlock, cooperation could not be an ongoing phenomenon in a body like the 
Senate that is always divided along party lines.153  This paper has emphasized 
instead that political institutions such as the White House and Senate differ in 
character, and that these differences determine the likelihood and sustainability  
of cooperative behavior.  
A third explanation should also be considered – namely, that 
appointments gridlock is a consequence of divided government.  Intuitively, it is 
not difficult to see how divided government might render judicial appointments 
problematic: divided government requires agreement to be reached not only 
across parties, but also across institutions, each with competing interests.  
Empirically, it is true that judicial nominations are significantly more likely to fail 
when the Senate and White House are controlled by different parties.154  As the 
conflict over Miguel Estrada and other controversial Bush nominees has 
                                                                                                                                                 
Democratic objections to alleged White House efforts to hide Estrada's views, and to Estrada 
himself as a  " stealth  nominee" ). 
153 See KREHBIEL, supra note 111, at 4 (detailing how most congressional  business proceeds by  
broad bipartisan coali tion). 
154 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 20, at 143-45 & tbl.4.2 (finding that control  of Senate is a 
significant predictor of whether Supreme Court nominations succeed); P.S. Ruckman Jr., The 
Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process, 55 J. POL. 793, 799-801 & 
801 tbl .1 (1993) (same), Hartley & Holmes, supra note 62, at 275 tbl.5 (reporting h igher 
confirmation rates and shorter delays for lower court nominees under unified government). 
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demonstrated,155 however, gridlock does not disappear merely because the same 
party holds both the White House and the Senate.  Supermajority requirements, 
of the kind that govern filibusters, ensure that even legislative minorities can 
obstruct nominations.156  Moreover, only rarely does unified government entail a 
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate; such conditions have existed only three 
times in the last century.157    
At best, it can be said that divided government increases the potential for 
gridlock – and, even then, only under certain conditions.158  Gridlock will occur 
even under unified government if presidents submit nominations that some 
critical number of senators finds ideologically unacceptable.  To be specific, a 
judicial nomination will fail on ideological grounds if the president nominates 
someone far enough from center to attract the opposition of (1) 50 or more 
senators who are prepared to vote against the nomination on the floor; (2) 40 or 
more senators who are prepared to filibuster; or, in the case of lower court 
nominees, (3) a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee.   
The effects of divided government and the threat of filibuster can be 
illustrated with a simple spatial model, in which the players are depicted as 
falling along a left-right ideological continuum:159  
 
                                                 
155 See George F. Will , Dean and Big Differences, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 72 (listing as likely 
victims of Democratic opposi tion – in addition to Miguel  Estrada - Janice Rogers Brown, Priscilla 
Owen, Carolyn Kuhl, William Pryor, Charles Pickering, and Terrence Boyle).  In the cases of 
Pryor and Pickering, the White House has bypassed the Senate entirely by making recess 
appointments.  See Allen, supra note 6, at A1. 
156 See BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 111, at 3. 
157 The most recent occasion was in the aftermath  of Watergate, when Democrats held sixty-one 
seats and lowered the number of votes required to break a filibuster from two-thirds of the 
Senate to sixty.  Democrats also enjoyed filibuster-proof majori ties in the mid-1960s and during 
the Great Depression. See ORNSTEIN, MANN & MILBIN, supra note 127, at 56-58 tbl  1-19.  As a 
practical  matter, the prevalence of conservative southern Democrats through the 1960s and into 
the 1970s means that these raw numbers overstate  the party's effective political  strength .  
158 In a legislative context, if the status quo policy is centrist and each  party holds enough seats 
and is cohesive enough to sustain a filibuster, all  changes in pol icy will  be filibustered, even 
under unified government.  See BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 111, at 34.  An analogy can be made 
to judicial  appointments that affect the ideological  balance on a court – for example, the 
replacement of a  Supreme Court justice who casts the deciding vote in close cases.  Such  " cri tical 
nominations"  are in fact significantly more prone to fail.  See Ruckman, supra note 154, at 796-803; 
Lemieux & Stewart, supra note 61, at 3-6, 14 tbl.2, 15, 16 tbl .3, 17 tbl .4. 
159 For an introduction to spatial  models, see ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957).  For a thorough discussion of legislative gridlock using spatial models, 
see KREHBIEL, supra note 111, at 21-47. 
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MR represents the position of the median senator when Republicans hold a 
majority in the Senate, while  MD represents the median senator when Democrats 
hold a majority.  To win the support of the median senator is to win a simple 
majority.160  Thus, if Democrats hold a majority, nominees to the left of MD will 
win a floor vote; equally, under a Republican majority, nominees to the right of 
MR will win on the floor.  The two points labeled FD and FR are filibuster pivots:  
nominees to the right of FD face a successful filibuster by forty or more 
Democrats, while nominees to the left of FR face the same from Republicans.  For 
the sake of simplicity, the Senate Judiciary Committee is omitted from the 
model,161 as are individual senators who might enjoy veto power over specific 
nominees by virtue of senatorial courtesy. 
Let us assume that divided government exists, in the form of a 
conservative Republican president faced with a Democratic Senate.  The 
president's ideal po int is PR: that is, he would like to appoint judges as close to PR 
as possible.  However, any attempt to appoint someone to the right of MD will be 
rejected on a floor vote.  Conversely, nominees to the left of FR will face a 
filibuster from members of the president's own party.  Thus, the best that the 
president can do is to nominate someone at MD.  Now assume that the 
Republicans bring about unified government by taking over the Senate.  The 
president can now appoint judges to the right of MR who are closer to his ideal 
point, but still cannot appoint judges to the right of FD.  Regardless of who 
                                                 
160 For purposes of identifying the median senator, the vice president counts as the 101st member 
of the Senate, on the side of the party in control  of the White House.  For an introduction to 
median voter theory, see, for example, KREHBIEL, cited above in note 111, at 12-14; or AVINASH 
DIXIT &  SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 481-88 (1999). 
161 The Senate Judiciary Committee can be omitted i f one assumes that the median member of the 
committee shares the same ideal  point as the median member of the full  Senate, but that 
assumption is open to question.  For a game-theoretic example of how committees with 
gatekeeping power, such  as the Senate Judiciary Committee, can affect the range of possible 
outcomes, see William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original 
Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J. L. ECON. &  ORG. 165, 180-
86 (1992). 
FR MR MD FD PR 
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controls either the White House or the Senate, any nominee left of FR or right of 
FD will be filibustered.  That is, gridlock occurs even under unified government if 
presidents are aggressive and ideologically extreme enough to submit 
nominations that fall beyond the other party's filibuster pivot.  And as argued 
above, presidents possess both the incentive and the means to try their luck 
repeatedly at precisely such behavior.  It is thus no accident that their increasing 
involvement in the selection of lower court judges has coincided with increasing 
gridlock of the judicial appointments process. 
 
B. The simple case: a world without divided government 
 
There are, however, less obvious implications of divided government not 
captured by the spatial model.  That is, the mere possibility of divided 
government may make cooperation more difficult to achieve.  Consider a simple 
game between two players, a governing party (G) and an opposition party (O), in 
which  governments are unitary and a party in power has its unrestricted way 
over what judges it will appoint.162  A game tree illustrates the sequence of play: 
                                                 
162 The astute reader may wonder whether the introduction of a  model  of strategic interaction 
between political parties consti tutes an unexplained shift in the analytical premises of the 
discussion: whereas the spatial  model  in Part IV.A depicts individual  legislators as the relevant 
players, Parts IV.B and IV.C rely upon a model  of strategic interaction between parties, not 
individual  legislators.  As a general  matter, spatial models of political  decisionmaking tend to 
embody an assumption - not uncommon in pol itical  science - that the aggregate behavior of 
individual  legislators, not the behavior of unified political  parties, determines policy outcomes.  
For a leading example of this view, see Krehbiel, cited above in note 111, at 26-28, 165-85.  In Part 
IV.B, however, the use of parties in lieu of individual  legislators is necessary because the 
discussion focuses upon a system of unitary government, along the lines of a  parliamentary 
system.  Unlike the American system of separated executive and legislative power, such  systems 
are characterized by strong party discipline, such  that it i s only realistic to suppose that the party 
leadership guides the behavior of party backbenchers.  See, e.g., The Hon. Sir John Laws, Law and 
Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72, 90 & n.51 (quoting Lord Hailsham's notorious description of the 
British  Parliament as an " elective dictatorship").   
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Each node of the game tree, represented by a circle (or oval), is a point at 
which one of the players – G, O, or chance – makes a move.  Chance determines, 
in the form of an election, whether G or O has the next move; the 1/2 probability 
denotes an assumption that both parties are equally likely to win elections.  As in 
the Prisoner's Dilemma, the strategies available to the players in this game are 
cooperation and defection, where defection consists of pursuing highly 
ideological appointments and cooperation consists of appointing either a mixed 
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bag or a consistently moderate set of judges.  The players move along the 
branches of the game tree according to the choices they make, until they arrive at 
an outcome.  Each outcome (numbered O1 through O8) contains a set of payoffs 
of the form (g, o), where g is the utility of that particular outcome to G and o is its 
utility to O.   
Though the actual numbers used to depict the payoffs are to some extent 
arbitrary, they convey some important information that may not be immediately 
obvious.  First, they have been specified in such a way as to make this a 
noncooperative, non-zero-sum game, like the Prisoner's Dilemma, in that the 
parties stand to gain from cooperation but cannot bind themselves in advance to 
do so.  Second, they crudely capture the notion that the players have discount 
factors.  Consider outcome O3: in reaching that outcome, G has defected against 
O, then O has defected against G, yet G still receives a higher payoff than O.  
Why might this be so?  All other things being equal, players tend to prefer 
rewards now over rewards later (and, conversely, punishments later over 
punishments now).  Discount factors simply measure the extent to which they do 
so.163  For example, people prefer to have money now rather than money later, 
and the price they pay to do so takes the form of an interest rate, which is a type 
of discount factor.  By the same token, G benefits by enjoying the gains of 
defection first, and suffering the pain of retaliation only later.  
  
C. Divided government and uncertainty 
 
Introducing the possibility of divided government complicates the game 
by introducing the equivalent of two sets of payoffs, one of which applies when 
government is divided, the other when government is unified.  A president 
stands to make much larger gains from behaving ideologically under unified 
government, than under divided government when confronted with an opposing 
Senate that will limit his gains.  The same is true for senators of the majority 
                                                 
163 The traditional game theory notation for a discount factor is δ, where 0 < δ < 1.  One multiplies 
a  given payoff, x, by the player's discount factor, δ ,to calculate the discounted payoff, which  is the 
value to the player of receiving x at a  later time. The more impatient the player, the lower δ will 
be.  For example, a  player with  a discount factor of δ = .8 discounts future payoffs by 20%.  A 
42
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 24 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art24
DRAFT 7/7/04  12:49 AM 42 
party confronted with a same-party president as opposed to someone from the 
opposing party. 
This variance in the potential payoffs creates a double-bind for would-be 
cooperators.  Consider first a divided-government scenario in which party G 
initially controls the White House while party O controls the Senate.  Let PG 
stand for a president of party G, and SO, a Senate under control of party O.  PG 
yearns for an end to ideologification and gridlock and understands that if 
cooperation is to begin anywhere, it must begin somewhere. PG thus chooses to 
behave cooperatively, either by nominating only moderate judges or by allowing 
SO to choose half the judges.  Party O then captures the White House while 
keeping control of the Senate.  Though PO understands that it is to everyone's 
benefit to reach a cooperative equilibrium, PO also fears exploitation.  PO's best 
choice of strategy depends, as always, upon how PO expects PG to behave in the 
future, and the best guide to PG's future behavior is PG's past behavior.   
How, then, should PO interpret PG's earlier cooperation?  The payoff that 
PO would now give up by behaving cooperatively under united government (PO, 
SO) is much greater than the payoff G gave up by behaving cooperatively under 
divided government (PG, SO).  Should PO believe that PG would have cooperated 
even under a united government (PG, SG)?  Or will PO, by cooperating now, end 
up sacrificing more than it will ever receive in return? PG's willingness to 
cooperate when party G controlled only half the government is not necessarily a 
convincing signal that PG would have behaved the same way had party G 
controlled the whole government.  PG has risked only minor exploitation in order 
to encourage PO to risk much greater exploitation.  Meanwhile, for her part, PG 
may choose never to cooperate in the first place because PG can foresee that PO 
will have precisely these doubts.  There is no reason for PG to cooperate at the 
outset if even actual cooperation will not convince PO of PG's desire to cooperate. 
The point of this scenario is to illustrate that divided government creates 
uncertainty, and that such uncertainty undermines efforts to reach a cooperative 
equilibrium.  There is no convincing way for members of a party that controls 
                                                                                                                                                 
payoff of 100 tomorrow is worth  the same to her as a payoff of 80 today.  80 is therefore her 
discounted payoff.  See MORROW, supra note 119, at 38. 
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only the White House to demonstrate that they would still cooperate if their  
party controlled the Senate as well.  The most credible signal of cooperative 
intent that a player can send, is to behave cooperatively.  When government 
shifts from divided to unified control, however, the players face a different set of 
payoffs, and neither side can be sure that the other will behave as cooperatively 
as before.  Not knowing how to interpret the other player's earlier cooperation in 
light of the change in payoffs makes reciprocal cooperation risky.  Moreover, to 
the extent that even cooperation cannot be relied upon to beget cooperation, 
neither side will want to make the initial cooperative move, and a cooperative 
equilibrium becomes that much more difficult to achieve. 
 
D. Divided government and impatience 
 
The particular problem of uncertainty described above disappears if the 
initial cooperative move is made under conditions of unified government.  A 
president faced with a like-minded Senate who nevertheless appoints moderate 
judges can only be acting in the hope of establishing a cooperative equilibrium; 
there is no other plausible interpretation of such behavior.  An initial cooperative 
move under conditions of unified government is unlikely, however, for reasons 
that are again exacerbated by the possibility of divided government.   
Consider this time a unified-government scenario in which  party G 
begins in control of both the White House and the Senate (PG, SG).  As before, PG 
understands that a cooperative equilibrium would be better for all concerned in 
the long run.  In the meantime, however, defection is very tempting.  First, PG can 
make considerably greater headway at remaking the bench ideologically under 
unified government than under divided government.  Second, PG cannot be sure 
when such an opportunity will ar ise again.  Third, in order for O to inflict  
commensurate retaliation, O will have to capture both the White House and the 
Senate.  That, in turn, may take some time.  Over the long run, assuming that the 
players enjoy comparable electoral success, the payoffs they receive from 
cooperation should even out.  But the possibility of divided government means it 
may take a while for today's cooperation to be repaid commensurately, or for 
today's defection to be punished commensurately.   
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To behave cooperatively today taxes PG's patience or, more precisely, 
demands a relatively low discount factor.  Steep discount factors make defection 
more attractive because they make gains today more attractive relative to losses 
tomorrow and thus undermine the efficacy of retaliation.  It is unlikely, in turn, 
that presidents have especially low discount factors, given the relatively short 
window of opportunity that they face.  We might expect them to be less patient 
than senators, in particular, for the same reason that they are less disciplined by 
the threat of retaliation: they are not repeat players to the same extent.  Thinking 
about patience and discount factors turns out to be another way of arriving at the 
same conclusion reached throughout – namely, that presidents will be less prone 
to cooperate than senators. 
In sum, uncertainty and impatience are endemic to strategic interactions, 
and the appointment of federal judges is no exception.  Both are barriers to 
cooperation, and the possibility of divided government contributes to both.  
Insofar as presidents are less patient than senators, moreover, their increased 
involvement in the judicial appointments process will work against cooperation. 
 
V.  CONCLUS ION 
 
This paper has argued that conflict over the appointment of federal judges 
– in particular, circuit judges - has escalated due at least in part to the fact that 
the White House has played an increasing role in the selection process since the 
late 1970s.  The explanatory force of the argument rests upon the notion of repeat 
play, which facilitates cooperation among political actors of opposing ideological 
stripes but binds presidents and senators differently.  As with most theories, 
crucial questions remain unanswered, by design or otherwise.  For example, 
might an increase in interparty conflict over judicial appointments have been 
inevitable regardless of the relative roles played by the White House and Senate?  
The postwar period has seen sustained increases in the ideological distance 
between Republicans and Democrats.  The Eisenhower years were a period of 
unprecedented ideological convergence among both voters and congressional 
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parties.164  By the 1970s, polarization of the electorate had produced divisive 
presidential elections and candidates, but the advantages of incumbency 
postponed comparable polarization in Congress into the 1990s.165  To the extent 
that conflict over judicial appointments is a function of the ideological distance 
between the relevant political actors, the displacement of senators by presidents 
in the appointments process may merely have hastened or exacerbated conflict 
and gridlock that were already bound to increase for reasons of party and 
electoral polarization.  Polarization and presidential involvement can be deemed 
complementary explanations for the heightened levels of judicial appointments 
conflict and gridlock observed over the last quarter-century.  Their relative 
importance, however, remains to be evaluated. 
One might also ask why expansion of the White House's role did not 
occur prior to the 1970s, particularly in light of the incentives that presidents face 
to take greater control of judicial appointments.  A plausible story might 
implicate popular reaction to the work of the Warren Court: the opposition of a 
substantial proportion of the population to controversial Warren Court decisions, 
not least of all in the electorally pivotal South, provided right-leaning politicians 
with the incentive to campaign against the existing judiciary.166  Viewed in this 
light, Reagan's consolidation of the selection process in the White House 
becomes unsurprising, insofar as he was the first post-Warren Court Republican 
president to face a Senate of his own party and hence enjoyed an opportunity to 
act that was denied both Nixon and Ford.   
That Carter, a Democratic president, was the one to wrest power from 
senators of his own party may not have been a historical accident either.  Rather, 
it may have reflected an unusual institutional configuration of ostensibly unified 
government under an unevenly divided party.  Though himself a southerner, 
Carter's views on civil rights aligned him with the increasingly dominant liberal 
                                                 
164 See David W. Brady & Hahrie Han, Party Polarization in the Post WWII Era: A Two Period 
Electoral Interpretation 4-8 (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with  author). 
165 See id. at 8-22 (using regression analysis to predict changes in the ideological  positioning of 
House members over the post-war period); see also USLANER, supra note 133, at 4-6 (suggesting 
that partisan conflict within Congress grew considerably between the 1960s and 1980s). 
166 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 50, 59 (1976) (cri ticizing in other respects the argument made by Dahl, cited above in note 
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northern wing of the Democratic Party, at a time when Senator Eastland, chair of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, epitomized its waning conservative southern 
wing.  Moreover, it has been observed, and there is empirical reason to believe, 
that senatorial courtesy places a president under a greater obligation to senators 
of his own party than to those of the opposing party.167  Thus, insofar as senators 
from the southern states remained both conservative and Democratic, senatorial 
courtesy may have imposed more onerous ideological constraints upon Carter 
than upon his Republican predecessors, especially with respect to the 
appointment of judges in the south.168  Under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, decentralization of the selection process may have been in the 
best interest of the Democratic Party, insofar as it enabled both northern and 
southern Democrats to have their share of judicial picks and thus defused a 
potential source of intraparty tension.  By Nixon's time, however, Republicans 
had made political inroads in the south, and Carter's desire and ability to wrest 
power from senators of his own party169 may have reflected - if not hastened - the 
decline of the party's southern wing.  Whatever the explanation, the means by 
which Carter chose to pursue his stated goals of merit and diversity may have 
borne consequences he did not intend.  
                                                                                                                                                 
93, but conceding the likelihood that " unpopular [judicial ] decisions became part of the country's 
poli tical  agenda, and changes in pol itical  regimes affected recrui tment to the Court" ). 
167 Commentators often note that senators of the president's party have an unusually strong 
influence upon the selection of district judges.  See GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 13 (observing that 
district court appointments " typically are dominated by senators of the president's party" ); 
GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 143, 147 (noting that senatorial courtesy traditionally "has referred to 
the deference the president owes to the recommendations of senators from his own party," but 
also reporting that the blue slip is supposedly effective regardless of the home state senator's 
party); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 5-6, 24 (Kenneth  N. Vines ed., 1971 ed.) (1961) (suggesting that senatorial 
courtesy constitutes a binding rule only "in the case of district judges"  and "i f the senator belongs 
to the same party as the President"  (emphasis in original)).  Empirical  research  suggests, 
however, that this same-party favori tism extends to the selection of circuit judges as well: Songer 
and Ginn have found that home-state senators of the president's party, but not those of the 
opposing party, have a statistically significant influence upon the ideology of circui t court 
appointees.  See Songer & Ginn, supra note 43, at 312-22. 
168 See Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE L.J. 90, 109 (1963) ("Since senators 
from the southern states are almost unanimously both  segregationist in sentiment and Democrat 
in name, these practices will  create the strongest pressure for the appointment of judges with 
segregationist leaning when there is a  Democratic President."); cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at 
129-30 (noting that, despite his own indifference to civil  rights matters, Eisenhower succeeded in 
appointing a number of segregation opponents to the battleground F ourth  and Fifth  Circuits). 
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Just as this paper does not seek to resolve these larger questions of 
electoral and political causation, it does not purport to offer solutions to the 
problems of ideologification, extremism, and gridlock.  This reticence stems in 
part from the fact that there are no obvious solutions – or, at least, none that 
appear likely to work.  First, it is as pointless as it is popular for commentators to 
call for civility, cooperation, and ideological restraint.170  Ill will is not the real 
problem.  Though human and thus prone to fits of pique, politicians are also  
rational, goal-oriented individuals who can be expected to put aside animosity if 
it is in their best interest to do so.  Hence the Senate folkways of courtesy and 
reciprocity observed by Matthews: senators cooperate and behave courteously 
toward each other because it enhances their ability to get things done.  The real 
obstacle to cooperation is that no one perceives it  to be in their  best interest to 
take the risky first step toward cooperation.  To say that defection is an 
equilibrium, as has been argued here, means that the players are already doing 
the best that they can, in light of the payoffs they face and how they believe 
others will react.  To ask that they behave differently is to ask that they act 
against their perceived self-interest, and political actors – the kind who occupy 
the White House and Senate - are not known for martyrdom. 
Second, proposals by the players themselves to fix the situation are likely 
to be too blatantly self-interested to be taken seriously.  Predictably, given their 
control of the White House and filibuster-prone majority in the Senate, 
Republicans have proposed to weaken the filibuster rules and to create binding 
timelines for committee and floor action,171 while Democrats have called upon 
the White House to cede power to nominating commissions or to the minority 
party in the Senate.172  Not surprisingly, when it comes to taking a leap of faith 
                                                 
170 See, e.g., Fueling the Fight, supra note 148, at A22; Carl  Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial 
Selection, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 721, 754-55 (2003); Slotnick, supra note 32, at 593; Escalation in the 
Senate, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2003, at A32; Contempt for the courts, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2003, at D4; 
Dewar, supra note 2, at A19; CARTER, supra note 68, at 187-88. 
171 See Dewar, supra note 2, at A19 (noting lack of Democratic enthusiasm for current Republ ican 
proposals to set binding timelines); Jason M. Roberts, Parties, Presidents, and Procedures: The Battle 
Over Judicial Nominations in the U.S. Senate, EXTENSIONS, Spring 2004, at 13, 17 (describing the 
Republ ican proposal  to require only a simple majority to end filibusters of judicial  nominees, 
after a  specified period of floor debate and four cloture motions). 
172 See E.J. Dionne Jr., Order and the Courts, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at A35 (describing 
Democratic Senator Charles Schumer's proposal  to set up bipartisan nomination commissions); 
Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23 (proposing that the White 
48
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 24 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art24
DRAFT 7/7/04  12:49 AM 48 
toward cooperation, each side is quick to demand that the other go first.  It has 
been suggested that the players might avert the temptation to make self-
interested proposals by imposing upon themselves a veil of ignorance and 
adopting reforms that would not become effective until some future date at 
which partisan control of the branches remains unknown.173  In practice, 
however, such a Rawlsian solution presupposes that political actors can be 
expected to observe self-imposed restraints once circumstances change and the 
gains to be had from lifting those restraints become apparent.  There is little to 
prevent a party that gains the upper hand in the future from changing the rules 
of judicial selection yet again. 
A third way out of the current predicament might be to retrace our steps 
by devolving power over lower court nominations from the White House back to 
individual senators, in a manner reminiscent of pre-Carter days.   Like the two 
considered above, this solution is problematic for the simple reason that it 
demands self-sacrifice.  Voluntary transfers of power between White House and 
Senate are most plausible under unified government, which offers at least a 
common aegis of party and ideology.  Even under such conditions, however, 
political actors are not keen to surrender power to other institutions, as 
evidenced by the opposition Carter encountered within his own party to the 
introduction of merit commissions.  Indeed, as compared to senators, presidents 
may be particularly unwilling to cede power over judicial appointments, given 
both their value as presidential campaign fodder and their salience to the 
national policy agenda.  Practical difficulties aside, the notion that presidents 
should abdicate responsibility for the selection of lower court judges is open to 
criticism on constitutional grounds as well: though some have argued that the 
Constitution contemplates a pre-nomination advisory role for the Senate,174 none 
                                                                                                                                                 
House invite members of the opposi tion party in the Senate to participate in selecting an 
indivisible slate of nominees).  Dellinger was sol ici tor general  in the Clinton administration. 
173 This approach  is raised - and promptly dismissed – by one Senate staffer in the bluntest of 
terms: "We should say we will  start this with  the next president. This is an interesting 
[suggestion]. Let's start i t with  the next set of guys so that none  of us really benefit. Well , I can 
assure you that will  never be offered."   Goldman et al., supra note 62, at 293 (quoting unnamed 
Senate aide). 
174 See, e.g., Senator Charles Mc. Mathias, Jr., Advice & Consent: The Role of the United States Senate 
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seem prepared to suggest that the actual selection of nominees is properly a task 
for senators.  
Yet another possibility is outside enforcement of cooperative behavior, in 
the form of an attentive polity ready and able to sanction its elected officials for 
defection.  In theory, elections provide a regulative mechanism by which the 
electorate can reward or punish the players for their behavior.  If the players 
could claim electoral credit for sacrificing their ideological interests in judicial 
appointments, their actions would no longer constitute sacrifices.  In practice, 
however, low levels of public knowledge about the judicial system175 preclude 
effective electoral accountability.  Nor can the public be expected to sanction 
undesired behavior in the judicial appointments process through so crude a 
mechanism as an up-or-down vote between two parties, with other, more 
important issues crowding the agenda.  
A last possibility to consider is not a solution at all but perhaps offers the 
greatest hope – namely, acceptance of the status quo.  At least for now, gridlock 
over controversial nominees does not seem likely to impair the work of the 
federal judiciary.  By the end of the Clinton administration, the vacancy rate on 
the federal bench had reached a noteworthy 12%.176  Yet even as Senate 
Democrats continue to block a number of appeals court nominees,177 the overall 
vacancy rate has declined to 4.5%, its lowest rate in thirteen years.178  Nor does 
                                                 
175 See, e.g., Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the 
Supreme Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 352, 352-73 (Lee J. Epstein ed., 1995) (reporting low 
levels of media coverage and publ ic awareness of Supreme Court decisions on controversial 
topics); Rosenberg, supra note 93, at 627-29 (" [S]urveys have consistently shown that only about 
forty percent of the American public, at best, follows Supreme Court actions, as measured by 
survey respondents having either read or heard something about the Court." ); MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 264 (1987) (citing Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the 
Sociology of  Law, 1983 WISC. L. REV. 379).  But see VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 72-86 (2003) (finding that evaluation of the Supreme Court in local 
communities changes in response to decisions that resolve controversies originating in those 
communities). 
176 See Lee Davidson, Hatch Threatens Tit-for-tat Tactic, DESERET NEWS (Sal t Lake City), May 12, 
2001, at A1. 
177 See Will , supra note 155, at 72. 
178 See David G. Savage, Vacancy Rate on Federal Bench Is at a 13-Year Low, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, 
at A14.  The overall  figure conceals the fact that the vacancy rate on the circui t bench  is higher 
than on the district bench  – 10% versus 3.3% - but in absolute terms, the number of vacancies on 
each  court is roughly equal : as of early 2004, the Senate Judiciary Committee's webpage lists 18 
circui t court vacancies and 22 district court vacancies.  See Senate Judiciary Committee, Status of 
Article III Judicial  Nominations (Nov. 5, 2003), at 
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/nominations.cfm (listing 18 circui t court vacancies and 22 
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attention to the ideology of nominees appear to threaten the quality of 
adjudication.  Those opposed to consideration of ideology would presumably 
urge exclusive reliance on ability instead.  Notably absent from criticism of the 
appointments process, however, is any serious suggestion that today's judges are 
less able than those appointed in less contentious times.  At the same time, 
ideology would seem to be a more relevant and defensible consideration than 
others that have been historically prevalent, such as patronage or party service.  
Indeed, those concerned by the countermajoritarian implications of judicial 
lawmaking ought perhaps to welcome open conflict in a democratic forum over 
the views of those seeking lifetime appointment.179  And if such conflict does 
serve a useful democratic purpose, it makes little sense to ask that either side – 
White House or Senate, Democrat or Republican - back down. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
district court vacancies); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 13, at tbl . k (li sting 
179 authorized circui t judgeships and 661 authorized district judgeships, both  permanent and 
temporary). 
179 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, How to judge future judges, DISSENT, Fall  2002, at 63, 67-68. 
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